AN EXAMINATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE [PDF]
Different types of adverse selection-type of insurance product, type of unit, type of coverage and number of actual yields reported in Federal crop insurance is examined utilizing binomial and ordered logit discrete choice models for all U.S.
Atwood, Joseph A., Shaik, Saleem
core +1 more source
Adverse Selection in the Children's Health Insurance Program. [PDF]
Morrisey MA +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Wage Dispersion and Labour Turnover with Adverse Selection [PDF]
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time.
Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Leo Kaas
core
Adverse Selection in Community Based Health Insurance among Informal Workers in Bangladesh: An EQ-5D Assessment. [PDF]
Ahmed S +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Can premium differentiation counteract adverse selection in the Dutch supplementary health insurance? A simulation study. [PDF]
van Winssen KPM +2 more
europepmc +1 more source
Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection [PDF]
We develop an analysis of ex ante monitoring of risky projects in banking. If protected from competition, banks are more concerned about not catching good risk projects when the perceived state of the economy improves, while they are more concerned about
Rune Stenbacka, Vesa Kanniainen
core
Estimating the adverse selection and moral hazard in Urban and Rural Resident Basic Medical Insurance of China: a semi-parametric estimation approach. [PDF]
Wu Y, Xu J.
europepmc +1 more source
Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice. [PDF]
Hackmann MB, Kolstad JT, Kowalski AE.
europepmc +1 more source
Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Evidence in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme? [PDF]
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on
Fraser, Iain +2 more
core +1 more source

