Results 111 to 120 of about 5,576,726 (364)
Asymmetric Information – Adverse Selection Problem [PDF]
Annals of Dunarea de Jos University. Fascicle I : Economics and Applied Informatics, 2007 The present paper makes an introduction in the contract theory starting with the definitions of asymmetric information and some of the problems that generate: moral hazard and adverse selection.
Dumitru MARIN, Anamaria ALDEA
doaj
The Eff ect of the Introduction of a “Pay Per Use“ Option within Motor TPL Insurance
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, 2014 In this paper the effects of the introduction of the so called “pay per use” -insurance products are examined. These products collect data of mileage of kilometers driven by policy holders. As a result of this data, policy holders can get a refund on the
Stefan Trappl +2 more
doaj +1 more source
The Development of the Irish Private Health Insurance Market and Evidence of Selection Effects Therein [PDF]
This paper tracks the development of the Irish private health insurance market, both in terms of its legislative background and the development of competition. Literature on adverse selection and risk selection is then reviewed.
Brian Turner, Edward Shinnick
core
Molecular Oncology, EarlyView.Methods to improve antibody–drug conjugate (ADC) treatment durability in cancer therapy are needed. We utilized ADCs and immune‐stimulating antibody conjugates (ISACs), which are made from two non‐competitive antibodies, to enhance the entry of toxic payloads into cancer cells and deliver immunostimulatory agents into immune cells.
Tiexin Wang +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance. [PDF]
J Econom, 2021 Powell D, Goldman D.
europepmc +1 more source
Corruption and Adverse Selection [PDF]
, 2019 It is well known that in the presence of asymmetric information, adverse selection has detrimental effects on possible exchanges. We go a step further, and present a game-theoretic setup in which under such adverse selection effects there are uncertain benefits for bribing unknown players’ types (e.g., individuals, committees, or companies).
Koutsougeras, Leonidas +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Adverse Selection and Security Design [PDF]
The Review of Economic Studies, 1996 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +4 more sources
Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Theoretical Economics, 2015 We study a principal–agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk‐neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort.
D. Gottlieb, Humberto Moreira
semanticscholar +1 more source
Molecular Oncology, EarlyView.Etoposide induces DNA damage, activating p53‐dependent apoptosis via caspase‐3/7, which cleaves PARP1. Dammarenediol II enhances this apoptotic pathway by suppressing O‐GlcNAc transferase activity, further decreasing O‐GlcNAcylation. The reduction in O‐GlcNAc levels boosts p53‐driven apoptosis and influences the Akt/GSK3β/mTOR signaling pathway ...
Jaehoon Lee +8 more
wiley +1 more source