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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
Shareholder lawsuits are a principal legal means to control management agency costs in corporations, yet they generate their own agency costs from the attorneys who bring representative litigation. The key policy question, and one that is central to good corporate governance, has long been how to properly balance the positive management agency ...
Robert B. Thompson, Randall S. Thomas
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Shareholder lawsuits are a principal legal means to control management agency costs in corporations, yet they generate their own agency costs from the attorneys who bring representative litigation. The key policy question, and one that is central to good corporate governance, has long been how to properly balance the positive management agency ...
Robert B. Thompson, Randall S. Thomas
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Contingent Fees and Agency Costs
The Journal of Legal Studies, 1996In this article, I examine the operation of ordinary linear contingent fees in a model of litigation in which the recovery on a claim is a function of the lawyer's efforts. My object here is to analyze the linear fee that maximizes the client's welfare in the presence of attorney moral hazard.
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Agency costs and investment behavior [PDF]
, 2005 How do differences in the creit channel affect investment behavior in the U.S. and the Euro area? To analyze this question, we calibrate an agency cost model of business cycles. We focus on two key components of the lending channel, the default premium associated with bank loans and bankruptcy rates, to identify the differences in the U.S. and European
Dorofeenko, Viktor +2 more
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Agency Costs and Firm Productivity
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019We explore how the separation between ownership and control affects firm productivity. Using Finnish administrative data on the universe of limited liability firms, we document a substantial increase in firm productivity when the CEO obtains majority ownership or when the majority owner becomes the CEO.
Milo Bianchi, Henri Luomaranta
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Agency Costs of Institutional Trading
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006Under the typical institutional trading arrangement a portfolio manager makes the trade decision and a trading desk executes the trade, with execution performance evaluated against a benchmark such as the volume weighted average price (VWAP). We show that this trading arrangement provides incentives to the trader that are at odds with the objectives of
Roger M. Edelen, Gregory B. Kadlec
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Board Structure and Agency Costs
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002The purpose of the paper is to test the hypothesis that board structure and its impact on value is a function of firm's growth opportunities. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results show that, while low growth firms are less likely to have an independent board, i.e., to split the roles of the chairman and CEO, to have a high proportion of non ...
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2021
The amount of assets under management in the private equity industry that is left uninvested (called dry powder) has raised numerous concerns from the public. We model the fee collection of private equity sponsors and show that funds that accumulate substantial amounts of dry powder at the end of the investment period will tend to underlever future ...
Lambert, Marie +2 more
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The amount of assets under management in the private equity industry that is left uninvested (called dry powder) has raised numerous concerns from the public. We model the fee collection of private equity sponsors and show that funds that accumulate substantial amounts of dry powder at the end of the investment period will tend to underlever future ...
Lambert, Marie +2 more
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Agency cost: A missing link between female on board and firm performance
Business Strategy and Development, 2022Nguyen Vinh Khuong +2 more
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