Results 91 to 100 of about 5,055 (192)

Editorial: Time discounting as a tool to assess addictive behaviors and other disorders. [PDF]

open access: yesFront Public Health, 2023
Cruz Rambaud S   +2 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Locke's Diagnosis of Akrasia Revisited

open access: yesJournal of Modern Philosophy
Matthew Leisinger (2020) argues that previous interpretations of John Locke’s account of akrasia (or weakness of will) are mistaken and offers a new interpretation in their place.
Samuel C. Rickless
doaj   +2 more sources

Rational Akrasia [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes.
Brunero, John
core  

El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto

open access: yesLogos, 2009
La argumentación en contra de la posibilidad de akrasia (“Veo lo mejor y, sin embargo, hago lo peor”, según la clásica formulación de Ovidio) que encontramos en las Disertaciones de Epicteto (Arriano) ha sido frecuentemente desatendida en los desarrollos
Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich
doaj  

Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality.
Fogal, Daniel
core  

The Possibility of Akrasia from the viewpoint of Socrates and Aristotle

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Investigations, 2015
When an agent acts contrary to his, all-things-considered, best judgment while he is able to do the best he acts akratically. Socrates for the first time posed the problem.
Gholam Hossein
doaj  

A plea for descriptive social ontology. [PDF]

open access: yesSynthese, 2023
Koslicki K, Massin O.
europepmc   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy