Results 151 to 160 of about 5,055 (192)
Knowledge Versus Understanding: What Drives Moral Progress? [PDF]
Ethical Theory Moral PractBodlović P, Kudlek K.
europepmc +1 more source
Assessment of decision-making autonomy in chronic pain patients: a pilot study. [PDF]
BMC Med Ethicsd'Ussel M +4 more
europepmc +1 more source
Legislative Intent and Agency: A Rational Unity Account. [PDF]
Oxf J Leg StudCollins S, Tan D.
europepmc +1 more source
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Ratio, 1994
AbstractAristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose
openaire +1 more source
AbstractAristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose
openaire +1 more source
2018
The standard analysis of weak-willed (akratic) action is that the agent acts on a reason she acknowledges as weaker than another she could have acted on. I argue that it does not make sense to think that the akratic “adds up” all her reasons and then opts to act on the weaker set.
openaire +2 more sources
The standard analysis of weak-willed (akratic) action is that the agent acts on a reason she acknowledges as weaker than another she could have acted on. I argue that it does not make sense to think that the akratic “adds up” all her reasons and then opts to act on the weaker set.
openaire +2 more sources
2019
Abstract This chapter argues that epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible. The first task is to describe just what akrasia comes to. Loosely speaking, it is having a belief and thinking one should not have this belief, but there are three importantly different ways to make this precise.
openaire +2 more sources
Abstract This chapter argues that epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible. The first task is to describe just what akrasia comes to. Loosely speaking, it is having a belief and thinking one should not have this belief, but there are three importantly different ways to make this precise.
openaire +2 more sources
2009
Abstract Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak ...
openaire +1 more source
Abstract Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak ...
openaire +1 more source
Akrasia, Dispositions And Degrees
Erkenntnis, 2000It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate.
openaire +2 more sources
Philosophical Studies, 1970
ONE Of the standard objections to Hare's prescriptivist analysis of moral judgments is that this analysis is incompatible with the phenomenon of akrasia or "weakness of will." According to the prescriptivist analysis, so the familiar argument runs, it is impossible to assent to a moral judgment (or, at any rate, to assent "fully" to a moral judgment ...
openaire +1 more source
ONE Of the standard objections to Hare's prescriptivist analysis of moral judgments is that this analysis is incompatible with the phenomenon of akrasia or "weakness of will." According to the prescriptivist analysis, so the familiar argument runs, it is impossible to assent to a moral judgment (or, at any rate, to assent "fully" to a moral judgment ...
openaire +1 more source