Results 161 to 170 of about 5,055 (192)
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Abstract This chapter shows that the ignorance of the akratic is in fact a lack of phronēsis, and therefore a failure of persuasion. The akratic, like the enkratic, does not fully grasp the reasons or the values that ground her decision to act well and therefore fails to bring in line her non-rational desires. Hence, the ignorance of the
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Mind & Language, 2019
AbstractEpistemic akrasia is the phenomenon of voluntarily believing what you think you should not. Whether epistemic akrasia is possible is a matter of controversy. I argue that at least some people who suffer from obsessive–compulsive disorder are genuinely epistemically akratic.
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AbstractEpistemic akrasia is the phenomenon of voluntarily believing what you think you should not. Whether epistemic akrasia is possible is a matter of controversy. I argue that at least some people who suffer from obsessive–compulsive disorder are genuinely epistemically akratic.
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2017
In a case of practical akrasia, we freely do something even though we judge that we ought not to do it. This chapter discusses the possibility of epistemic akrasia. Epistemic akrasia is possible only if (a) a person’s (first-order) beliefs can diverge from their higher-order judgements about what it would be reasonable for them to believe, and (b ...
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In a case of practical akrasia, we freely do something even though we judge that we ought not to do it. This chapter discusses the possibility of epistemic akrasia. Epistemic akrasia is possible only if (a) a person’s (first-order) beliefs can diverge from their higher-order judgements about what it would be reasonable for them to believe, and (b ...
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2019
Abstract Chapter 9 argues that accessibilism is needed to explain the epistemic irrationality of epistemic akrasia—roughly, believing things you believe you shouldn’t believe. Section 9.1 defines epistemic akrasia and separates questions about its possibility and its rational permissibility.
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Abstract Chapter 9 argues that accessibilism is needed to explain the epistemic irrationality of epistemic akrasia—roughly, believing things you believe you shouldn’t believe. Section 9.1 defines epistemic akrasia and separates questions about its possibility and its rational permissibility.
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Philosophical Explorations, 2002
Abstract Strict akratic actions, by definition, are performed freely. However, agents may seem not to be selfgoverned with respect to such actions and therefore not to perform them autonomously. If appearance matches reality here, freedom and autonomy part company in this sphere. Do they? That is this article's guiding question.
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Abstract Strict akratic actions, by definition, are performed freely. However, agents may seem not to be selfgoverned with respect to such actions and therefore not to perform them autonomously. If appearance matches reality here, freedom and autonomy part company in this sphere. Do they? That is this article's guiding question.
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2017
To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed. Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one’s reasonable resolutions.
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To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed. Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one’s reasonable resolutions.
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Philosophical Studies, 2009
Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.
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Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.
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Philosophia, 1982
Analyse et discussion du concept d'"akrasia", considere comme un paradigme d'irrationalite et restreint au cas du desir et du souhait. L'A. discute en particulier de la theorie davidsonienne de l'akrasia suivant laquelle le sujet qui y est soumis ne se contredit ni consciemment, ni inconsciemment.
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Analyse et discussion du concept d'"akrasia", considere comme un paradigme d'irrationalite et restreint au cas du desir et du souhait. L'A. discute en particulier de la theorie davidsonienne de l'akrasia suivant laquelle le sujet qui y est soumis ne se contredit ni consciemment, ni inconsciemment.
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Philosophical Studies, 1983
We may, and should, reject Davidson's (P2) — the claim that any agent who judges (unconditionally) that it is better to do x than to do y is more strongly motivated to do x than to do y — without having to abandon a causal theory of action. (P2) is false.
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We may, and should, reject Davidson's (P2) — the claim that any agent who judges (unconditionally) that it is better to do x than to do y is more strongly motivated to do x than to do y — without having to abandon a causal theory of action. (P2) is false.
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