Results 31 to 40 of about 5,055 (192)

Akrasia – status of weak-willed actions in philosophy of law [PDF]

, 2012
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term denoting a phenomenon when one acts freely and intentionally contrary to his or her better judgment. Discussion of akrasia originates in the Plato's Protagoras where he states that “No one who either knows or believes ...
Banaś, Paweł
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Is higher-order evidence evidence? [PDF]

, 2020
Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question?
Tal, Eyal
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons [PDF]

, 2018
It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
Daoust, Marc-Kevin
core   +1 more source

Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for Know-How [PDF]

, 2020
This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of “knowing-how”. It is argued that in addition to his motive of discounting a certain theory of mind, his interest in the notion also stemmed (and perhaps ...
Dougherty, Matt
core   +2 more sources

Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification ...
Guido Tana
wiley   +1 more source

Does Aristotle have a dialectical attitude in EE I 6: a negative answer [PDF]

, 2017
In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry.
Mendonça, Fernando Martins
core   +3 more sources

Appreciating the Evidence

Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been ...
Kevin McCain
wiley   +1 more source

Reconsidering Resolutions [PDF]

, 2016
In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a ...
Liberman, Alida
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Culpable Ignorance and Causal Deviance

Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 26-34, March 2026.
ABSTRACT I argue that tracing theorists of culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should reject the widely accepted principle that culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should always be traced through culpability for the ignorance itself. Two kinds of cases are considered in which culpability for ignorant wrongdoing ultimately traces back to culpability for
Thomas A. Yates
wiley   +1 more source

Updating for Externalists [PDF]

, 2021
The externalist says that your evidence could fail to tell you what evidence you do or not do have. In that case, it could be rational for you to be uncertain about what your evidence is. This is a kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesian epistemology
Gallow, J. Dmitri
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