Results 71 to 80 of about 5,055 (192)

Necesidad práctica y akrasía

open access: yesTópicos, 2013
In this paper I examine Aristotle's notion of practical necessity in the Nicomachean Ethics. This topic has received little attention in spite of its importance for the understanding of aristotelian practical syllogism.
Carmen Trueba Atienza
doaj   +1 more source

The value of incoherence

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 37-58, October 2024.
Abstract I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy.
Claire Field
wiley   +1 more source

Agency as Irony: Akrasia and (In)Action in Antony and Cleopatra and Othello

open access: yesRevista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses, 2012
This paper discusses the matter of agency and intention in Shakespearean tragedy from a perspective defined by akrasia, or the perplexity which is posed by a character who wilfully makes a decision (either for action or passivity) the effect of which is ...
Carvalho Homem, Rui
doaj   +1 more source

Taking North American White Supremacist groups seriously: The scope and the challenge of hate speech on the internet [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
This article aims to address two questions: how does hate speech manifest on North American white supremacist websites; and is there a connection between online hate speech and hate crime? Firstly, hate speech is defined and the research methodology upon
Cohen-Almagor, Raphael
core   +4 more sources

The relational foundations of epistemic normativity

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 285-304, October 2024.
Abstract Why comply with epistemic norms? In this paper, I argue that complying with epistemic norms, engaging in epistemically responsible conduct, and being epistemically trustworthy are constitutive elements of maintaining good epistemic relations with oneself and others. Good epistemic relations are in turn both instrumentally and finally valuable:
Cameron Boult
wiley   +1 more source

Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2020
In many ways one’s quest for knowledge can go wrong. Since the publication ofAmélie Rorty’s article “Akratic Believers”, in 1983, there has been a great deal of discussion asto one particular form of flaw in reasoning to which we, as less-than-perfect ...
Veronica S. Campos
doaj   +1 more source

Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 132-149, October 2024.
Abstract What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period.
Sebastian Schmidt
wiley   +1 more source

Bias in perceptual learning

open access: yesWIREs Cognitive Science, Volume 15, Issue 5, September/October 2024.
We provide a framework for understanding the varieties of bias ‐including moral biases‐ that occur in perceptual learning: bias is always at least a three‐place predicate, where a given component of the perceptual learning process p is biased relative to a deviation from a standard or norm s, and an environment or domain e.
Madeleine Ransom, Robert L. Goldstone
wiley   +1 more source

Platonism and Akrasia in Chrysippus. The Interpretation of Marcelo Boeri

open access: yesIdeas y Valores, 2010
The paper addresses two questions regarding the interpretation of akrasia among the Stoics, offered by Marcelo Boeri in his book Appearance and Reality in Greek Thought: On the one hand, can Chrysippus’s monistic adaptation of the Platonic model of the ...
Ricardo Salles
doaj  

Higher-Order Uncertainty [PDF]

open access: yes
You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. I defend three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes
Dorst, Kevin
core   +1 more source

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