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2005
AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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Episteme, 2015
ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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Symposium, 1999
Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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2018
Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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2010
This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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Giving reasons and given reasons
2021Abstract Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts.
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Philotheos, 2018
This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning
Ratio, 2004AbstractThe concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished.
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Public reason and the normativity of the reasonable
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2004The main purpose of the paper is to contribute to reconstructing the kind of normativity underlying Rawls’s notion of public reason and of the reasonable. The implicit target is the somewhat popular view according to which the transition from the framework of A Theory of Justice to that of Political Liberalism would entail a loss of normativity. On the
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