Results 131 to 140 of about 337,008 (288)
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT A platform matches a unit mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit‐quality. After matching, sellers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it price‐offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the platform, but sellers make inferences from
Daniele Condorelli, Balazs Szentes
wiley +1 more source
Bidding behavior in the bisection auction – an experimental investigation [PDF]
We present a laboratory experiment in which we investigate bidding behavior with independent private values in the recently proposed bisection auction, and compare it with two classical auction formats - the Vickrey auction and the English auction.
Grigorieva, Elena, Strobel, Martin
core +1 more source
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
SELLING LAND PLOTS AT PUBLIC AUCTION: NOVELS OF LEGISLATION
Russian Journal of Economics and Law, 2015 Objective: to examine the relevant issues concerning the acquisition of land plots in state or municipal ownership, by physical persons and legal entities. Methods: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, comparative-legal, dialectic.
E. V. Proshunina
doaj
Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions [PDF]
The Turkish government wanted to sell two GSM (cell-phone) licenses in 2000 with sequential auctions. The winning bid in the first auction would be the reserve price for the second auction. This auction design gives incentives to ``predatory bidding." We
Hikmet Gunay, Xin Meng
core
Fossil Fuels and Renewable Energy: Mix or Match?
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article investigates the influence of technological ownership on pricing strategies and productive efficiency. Our motivation comes from the evolving landscape of electricity markets where firms are transitioning from diversified to specialized portfolios, focusing on renewable energy or fossil fuels.
Natalia Fabra, Gerard Llobet
wiley +1 more source
On some solutions of topical problems of public purchasing auctions in Russia
Russian Journal of Economics and Law, 2014 Objective: to elaborate methods of increasing efficiency and results of public purchases in Russian public auctions. Methods: systemic analysis, statistical and abstract-logical methods.
D. S. Khvalynskiy
doaj
Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: Oral Outcry vs. Clock [PDF]
This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an open outcry auction, where bidders are allowed to call their own bids.
John D Hey, Ricardo Gonçalves
core
Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that the signaling incentive would lower the seller's payoff and the probability of sale. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform.
Junyan Guan, Boli Xu
wiley +1 more source
Privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction scheme
Tongxin xuebao, 2020 Aiming the problem that the existing reverse spectrum auctions do not take the non-price attribute of spectrum into account and the security of spectrum auction,a privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction was proposed.Firstly,price and ...
Jiaqi WANG +4 more
doaj