Results 231 to 240 of about 7,090 (268)
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
Abstract We provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a selling mechanism used by an Internet web-site that combines important features of auctions and gambling. This is the first analysis of such a selling mechanism, which provides insights into how the two kinds of behavior might be related in real life.
Yaron Raviv, Gabor Virag
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Abstract We provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a selling mechanism used by an Internet web-site that combines important features of auctions and gambling. This is the first analysis of such a selling mechanism, which provides insights into how the two kinds of behavior might be related in real life.
Yaron Raviv, Gabor Virag
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Economica, 1991
This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
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In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
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, 1996 The importance of auction theory has gained increased recognition in the scientific community, the latest recognition being the award of the Nobel price to Vickrey and Mirrlees. Auction theory has been used in quite different fields, both theoretically and empirically.
Boeheim, Rene, Zulehner, Christine
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Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges
IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 2023Zeshun Shi +2 more
exaly
Anti-collusion data auction mechanism based on smart contract
Information Sciences, 2021Wei Xiong
exaly
Auction Approaches for Resource Allocation in Wireless Systems: A Survey
IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 2013, Dusit Niyato, Chonho Lee
exaly