Results 131 to 140 of about 3,024 (267)

Private Land Ownership: Tax or Socialize?

open access: yesThe American Journal of Economics and Sociology, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study compares the land reform concepts of Henry George and Silvio Gesell, both of whom rejected private appropriation of land rent as unjust. While George proposed to “hollow out” private land ownership through a comprehensive land value tax, Gesell aimed at full socialization of land combined with lease auctions and compensation of ...
Dirk Loehr
wiley   +1 more source

Auctions and shareholdings

open access: yesAnnals of Economics and Statistics, 2008
Nous étudions l'impact des participations au capital sur les enchères à valeurs privées indépendantes. Le revenu de l'enchère décroît lorsque les acheteurs ont des participations croisées et croît lorsqu'ils détiennent une partie du capital du vendeur. Dans tous les cas de participations capitalistiques, les formats d'enchères ne sont plus équivalents.
openaire   +3 more sources

Henry George and Silvio Gesell: The Odd Couple

open access: yesThe American Journal of Economics and Sociology, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Henry George (1839–1897) and Silvio Gesell (1862–1930) developed distinct yet overlapping economic reform agendas. Both advocated land reform, free markets, and rejection of protectionism, but differed sharply on money, interest, and taxation.
Dirk Loehr
wiley   +1 more source

Credit Market Frictions and Bankruptcy Law Design—Implications for Korea*

open access: yesAsia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, EarlyView.
Abstract Bankruptcy law design has important implications for financial markets and economic growth. As bankruptcy law design interacts with local economic and political conditions, it is important to consider these factors when designing optimal bankruptcy law.
David Schoenherr
wiley   +1 more source

Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley   +1 more source

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