Results 261 to 270 of about 141,606 (307)
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Economica, 1991
This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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Review of Economic Studies, 2000
The paper deals with asymmetric auctions. ``Asymmetries are often important in contract bidding. Each potential contractor has essentially the same information about the nature of the project but a different opportunity cost of completing it. Whenever some aspect of these differences is common knowledge, beliefs are asymmetric. In major art auctions as
Maskin, Eric, Riley, John
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The paper deals with asymmetric auctions. ``Asymmetries are often important in contract bidding. Each potential contractor has essentially the same information about the nature of the project but a different opportunity cost of completing it. Whenever some aspect of these differences is common knowledge, beliefs are asymmetric. In major art auctions as
Maskin, Eric, Riley, John
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
An auction is efficient if, at game equilibrium, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the item on the block. For private values, it is well known that a Vickrey auction is efficient. For common values, a Vickrey auction may no longer be efficient. The main result of this paper gives sufficient conditions under which a Vickrey auction is efficient
Dasgupta, Partha, Maskin, Eric
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An auction is efficient if, at game equilibrium, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the item on the block. For private values, it is well known that a Vickrey auction is efficient. For common values, a Vickrey auction may no longer be efficient. The main result of this paper gives sufficient conditions under which a Vickrey auction is efficient
Dasgupta, Partha, Maskin, Eric
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, 1987 This paper discusses two central questions: Why do auction institutions continue to be so popular after thousands of years? and What accounts for particular details, like the popularity of sealed bid and ascending-bid auctions?
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When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in dominant strategies if and only if it maximizes producer surplus in dominant strategies. With two firms, the effect
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2000
The paper deals with the \(n\)-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auctions in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. The main purpose is to obtain conditions ensuring the existence of an efficient ex post equilibrium in which for every realization of the signals the object is obtained by the bidder with the ...
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The paper deals with the \(n\)-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auctions in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. The main purpose is to obtain conditions ensuring the existence of an efficient ex post equilibrium in which for every realization of the signals the object is obtained by the bidder with the ...
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Electricity market design and renewable energy auctions: The case of Brazil
Energy Policy, 2021Tiago de Barros Correia, Wikus Kruger
exaly
How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe
Energy Policy, 2022Vasilios Anatolitis, Alina Azanbayev
exaly
Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions [PDF]
, 2010 We argue that in order to achieve the VCG outcomes in combinatorial auctions, the auctioneer does not need to make a full contractual agreement on the protocol with participants. We can leave the detail of its design to the auctioneer's discretion. The auctioneer can even make it contingent on unverifiable information.
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