Results 71 to 80 of about 46,233 (212)
Auctions Versus Private Negotiations in Buyer-Seller Networks
Games, 2016 Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks.
Alison Watts
doaj +1 more source
Sequential Internet Auctions with Different Ending Rules [PDF]
Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. In hard close auctions, each auction ends with a fixed deadline determined by a seller.
Toshihiro Tsuchihashi
core
Corruption in Procurement Auctions [PDF]
, 2006 We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure electronic
Lengwiler, Yvan +2 more
core +1 more source
On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects [PDF]
Vickrey auctions, multi-item auctions, combinatorial auctions,
James Schummer, Sven de Vries
core
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale [PDF]
We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric independent private values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria with active resale markets and positive profits for
Rod Garratt, Thomas Troger
core +2 more sources
Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions [PDF]
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper
Paul Klemperer
core
Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment [PDF]
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest more often prior to second price auctions than prior ...
Veronika Grimm +3 more
core
Auctions: Theory and Practice [PDF]
This book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics.
Paul Klemperer
core +2 more sources
On the “Exclusion Principle” in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information
MathematicsThe number, and types, of participants in an auction can meaningfully affect the outcome of the competition. In a complete-information, all-pay context, previous studies proved that in first-price auctions, if the auctioneer maximizes the total bid ...
Nicola Dimitri
doaj +1 more source
Designing Electricity Auctions [PDF]
Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions.
Natalia Fabra +2 more
core