Results 31 to 40 of about 763,157 (113)
Representing default knowledge in biomedical ontologies: application to the integration of anatomy and phenotype ontologies. [PDF]
BMC Bioinformatics, 2007 Hoehndorf R, Loebe F, Kelso J, Herre H.
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Uniform semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics
, 2003 Marc Denecker +2 more
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Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic
, 2003 The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and only if the
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Uniform semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics [PDF]
, 2000 Marc Denecker +2 more
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Relating fuzzy autoepistemic logic to fuzzy modal logics of belief
, 2021 Marjon Blondeel +3 more
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From Default and Autoepistemic Logics to Disjunctive Answer Set Programs via the Logic of GK
, 2014 Jianmin Ji, Hannes Straß
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Distributed autoepistemic logic and its application to access control [PDF]
, 2016 Pieter Van Hertum +3 more
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Avoiding Logical Omniscience by Default - An Investigation into Autoepistemic Logic (Levesque, 1990)
, 2009 Matthias Unterhuber
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Fundamenta Informaticae, 1992
We propose a new variant of autoepistemic logic which, intuitively, corresponds to understanding a belief operator L as “is known”, in contrast to the interpretation of L as “is believed” in Moore’s autoepistemic logic. Formal properties of the new logic and relationship to Moore’s logic are studied in detail.
G. Schwarz
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We propose a new variant of autoepistemic logic which, intuitively, corresponds to understanding a belief operator L as “is known”, in contrast to the interpretation of L as “is believed” in Moore’s autoepistemic logic. Formal properties of the new logic and relationship to Moore’s logic are studied in detail.
G. Schwarz
semanticscholar +3 more sources