Results 61 to 70 of about 367 (91)
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On Cut-Elimination Arguments for Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Studia Logica, 2022
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Daichi Hayashi
exaly   +2 more sources

Axiomatic Theories of Truth

2011
At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms ...
exaly   +6 more sources

Remarks on Compositionality and Weak Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2013
The paper draws attention to an important, but apparently neglected distinction relating to axiomatic theories of truth, viz. the distinction between weakly and strongly truth-compositional theories of truth. The paper argues that the distinction might be helpful in classifying weak axiomatic theories of truth and examines some of them with respect to ...
GÜNTHER Eder
exaly   +3 more sources

Generalized Quantification in an Axiomatic Truth Theory

open access: yesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Bruno Whittle (2019) has recently extended Kripke’s semantical theory of truth to languages containing generalized quantifiers. There are reasons for axiomatizing semantical theories, and for regarding Halbach and Horsten’s PKF as a good axiomatization of Kripke’s. PKF is a theory in Partial Logic. The present paper complements Whittle’s by showing how
Ian Rumfitt
exaly   +2 more sources

Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground II [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Logic, 2017
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Johannes Korbmacher
exaly   +5 more sources

Axiomatic Theories of Truth and Reflection

2021
The concept of truth occupies a curious place in logic. On the one hand it is central; showing completeness and correctness for a given deductive system is a matter of showing that what is true lines up with what is provable. On the other hand truth is almost always a meta-theoretical notion, which is not present within the deductive systems considered.
openaire   +1 more source

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