Results 31 to 40 of about 69 (69)

What Voting Power Cannot Be

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT “Almost everyone,” Ronald Dworkin wrote in Sovereign Virtue, “assumes that democracy means equal voting power.” What, then, is voting power? The standard view defines it as the probability that a vote changes the outcome assuming that each possible combination of votes is equiprobable.
Daniel Wodak
wiley   +1 more source

Structure and Computation

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It is a truism of mathematics that differences between isomorphic number systems are irrelevant to arithmetic. This truism is deeply rooted in the modern axiomatic method and underlies most strands of arithmetical structuralism, the view that arithmetic is about some abstract number structure.
Balthasar Grabmayr
wiley   +1 more source

Why Are All the Sets All the Sets?

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory.
Tim Button
wiley   +1 more source

Aggregation and the Structure of Value

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Roughly, the view I call “Additivism” sums up value across time and people. Given some standard assumptions, I show that Additivism follows from two principles. The first says that how lives align in time cannot, in itself, matter. The second says, roughly, that a world cannot be better unless it is better within some period or another.
Weng Kin San
wiley   +1 more source

Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics

open access: yesPacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley   +1 more source

From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails.
Alexios Stamatiadis‐Bréhier
wiley   +1 more source

Wittgenstein, normativity and the ‘space of reasons’

open access: yesPhilosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
Abstract Wittgenstein's naturalism illuminates our ordinary normative practices of giving and asking for reasons and also related ‘philosophical’ conceptions of knowledge inspired by, for example, Sellars's image of the ‘space of reasons’. Some propose that the relevant naturalism motivates scepticism about the ‘space of reasons’ insofar as it ...
Benedict Smith
wiley   +1 more source

A Collapse Result in the Mereology of Properties

open access: yesRatio, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I examine five principles about the metaphysics of properties, each of which has been defended in the literature: (1) the sum of properties is their corresponding conjunctive property, (2) the mereology of properties is classical, (3) properties are individuated by necessary co‐instantiation, (4) sums of objects belonging to different ...
Alejandro G. Di Rienzo
wiley   +1 more source

“One Is a Frontier”: Settler Migration as Transmogrification

open access: yesSociological Forum, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper explores the trajectories and framing strategies of American Jewish migrants to Palestine–Israel. Drawing on original in‐depth interviews with immigrants who migrated between 1976 and 2021, alongside interviews with and observations of an “aliyah” agency, it examines meaning‐making around spatial relocation in relation to the ...
Joseph Kaplan Weinger
wiley   +1 more source

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