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Bargaining-Equilibrium Equivalence
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bhowmik, Anuj, Saha, Sandipan
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Public Choice, 2010 Is there a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the equilibrium in the competitive economy? The claim in this paper is that there is not. Bargaining models with well-specified equilibria have been built upon a shared sense of what is fair, concessions in proportion to harm from failure to agree or an imposed bargaining procedure.
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PLEA BARGAINING Bargain Justice?
Criminology, 1976Abstract An historical overview of the plea bargaining process through the past few centuries is presented. The advantages and disadvantages of the use of the legal mechanism are given. A research project conducted in Pima County, Arizona, covering 500 convicted persons who had been involved in plea bargaining is described, and the findings indicate ...
JOHN BARBARA +2 more
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The Review of Economic Studies, 1996
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Krishna, Vijay, Serrano, Roberto
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Krishna, Vijay, Serrano, Roberto
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International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 When buyers choose the order in which they bargain with suppliers of known characteristics, prices are determined jointly by bargaining power and competitive intensity (the outside option to bargain with rival suppliers). Bargaining power becomes less important to the outcome as competition intensifies; prices fall to marginal cost in the limit.
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The Review of Economic Studies, 2009
While there is an extensive literature on how economic agents bargain to divide an asset, little is known about the decision to initiate bargaining and how the initiation affects the outcome of bargaining. We address these questions in the context of high-stakes poker tournaments in which the last few players often negotiate the division of the ...
David Goldreich, Lukasz Pomorski
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While there is an extensive literature on how economic agents bargain to divide an asset, little is known about the decision to initiate bargaining and how the initiation affects the outcome of bargaining. We address these questions in the context of high-stakes poker tournaments in which the last few players often negotiate the division of the ...
David Goldreich, Lukasz Pomorski
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Bargaining power in crisis bargaining
Review of Economic Design, 2023zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
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Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1989
The problem of specifying the empirical conditions of, and prescriptive guidelines for, conflict resolution in deeply divided societies such as South Africa presents a challenge to both political theorists and public policy makers. The aim of this article is to assess the prospects for conflict resolution in South Africa by evaluating two divergent ...
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The problem of specifying the empirical conditions of, and prescriptive guidelines for, conflict resolution in deeply divided societies such as South Africa presents a challenge to both political theorists and public policy makers. The aim of this article is to assess the prospects for conflict resolution in South Africa by evaluating two divergent ...
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Bargaining and Bargaining Games
2020In this chapter, after specifying the bargaining problem a la Nash (1950), the Rubinstein game and its subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium are presented. The equilibrium is determined (1) by the shrinking of the cake to be distributed among the two players and (2) by how the shrinking is evaluated by the players.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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