Results 151 to 160 of about 63,609 (288)

Recent advances in Bayesian econometrics [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Econometrics, 2004
Bauwens, L, Lubrano, M, van Dijk, Herman
openaire   +2 more sources

When in Doubt, Tax More Progressively? Uncertainty and Progressive Income Taxation

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study the optimal income tax problem under parameter uncertainty about household preferences and wage dynamics. We derive conditions characterizing how such uncertainty affects optimal tax policy. To quantify the effect, we estimate a life‐cycle model using US data and a Bayesian approach.
Minsu Chang, Chunzan Wu
wiley   +1 more source

Network Games With Triadic Interactions

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We propose a model for network‐mediated interactions incorporating higher‐order relationships such as triadic interactions. The marginal utility of an individual's action depends explicitly on endogenous actions of multiple units. Conditions ensuring a unique Nash equilibrium are derived using a variational inequality approach. We estimate the
Wei Shi, Chunchao Wang, Pei Yu
wiley   +1 more source

Design and analysis of behavioral intervention studies: A Bayesian approach. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS One
Barragan Ibañez CN   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Identification and Estimation of Large Network Games with Private Link Information

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study the identification and estimation of large network games in which individuals choose continuous actions while holding private information about their links and payoffs. Extending the framework of Galeotti et al., we build a tractable empirical model of such network games and show that the parameters in individual payoffs are ...
Hülya Eraslan, Xun Tang
wiley   +1 more source

Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time.
Junichiro Ishida, Wing Suen
wiley   +1 more source

Essays in Bayesian Econometrics

open access: yesEssays in Bayesian Econometrics
早大学位記番号 ...
openaire  

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