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Functional belief and judgmental belief
Synthese, 2017A division between functional (animal) belief, on the one hand, and judgmental (reflective) belief, on the other, is central to Sosa’s two-tier virtue epistemology. For Sosa, mere functional belief is constituted by a first-order affirmation (or, perhaps, a simple disposition to affirm). In contrast, a judgmental belief is an intentional affirmation; a
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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1973
In this paper I shall try to sustain the view that reasons for believing are the same sort of reasons as reasons for other things; that if anything different is true about reasons for believing and reasons for certain other things, this is only because believing is different from those other things.
A. Phillips Griffiths, Donald McQueen
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In this paper I shall try to sustain the view that reasons for believing are the same sort of reasons as reasons for other things; that if anything different is true about reasons for believing and reasons for certain other things, this is only because believing is different from those other things.
A. Phillips Griffiths, Donald McQueen
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2022
This chapter explains why epistemologists are interested in degrees of belief (also known as "credences"). It compares working with degrees of belief to working with full beliefs and confidence comparisons. The chapter introduces the basic principles of Bayesian epistemology, then describes the contents of the rest of the book.
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This chapter explains why epistemologists are interested in degrees of belief (also known as "credences"). It compares working with degrees of belief to working with full beliefs and confidence comparisons. The chapter introduces the basic principles of Bayesian epistemology, then describes the contents of the rest of the book.
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief
Analytic Philosophy, 2014It is widely thought that we are at least sometimes responsible for our doxastic attitudes. We can be praised, blamed, or neutrally appraised for our beliefs, disbeliefs, and withholdings. However, many epistemologists have also pointed out that, despite the fact that we are responsible both for certain actions and for certain beliefs, there are ...
Peels, Rik, Booth, Anthony
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Belief base contraction by belief accrual
Artificial Intelligence, 2019zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Cristhian A. D. Deagustini +3 more
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Beliefs and Belief Relationships
1990Computer comprehension of editorial arguments in OpEd is based on the capability of modeling beliefs. Beliefs can be set apart from other conceptual structures needed to understand narrative text. As pointed out by Abelson (1973, 1979), beliefs are not goals, plans, events, or states, but rather predications about these structures and their ...
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Belief Merging for Possibilistic Belief Bases
2019Belief merging has received much attention from the research community with a large range of applications in Computer Science and Artificial Inteligence. In this paper, we represent a new belief merging approach for prioritized belief bases. The main idea of this method is to use two operators, namely connective strong operator and averagely increasing
Thi Thanh Luu Le, Trong Hieu Tran
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
Synthese, 2018zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Evaluating Belief System Networks as a Theory of Political Belief System Dynamics
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2021Mark J Brandt, Willem W A Sleegers
exaly
Full belief, partial belief, and contrastive belief
In contemporary epistemology, there are two broad approaches to conceptualizing belief. According to the qualitative conception, belief is all or nothing; an agent either believes some proposition, or she does not. This is often referred to as full belief.openaire +1 more source

