Results 21 to 30 of about 30,392 (251)
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2022 AbstractBelief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected.
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Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1999 We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ``ontology'' or scenario underlying the belief change process.
Nir Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern
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On the logic of theory change: iteration of expansion
Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society, 2018 Constructing models that allow for iterated changes is one of the most studied problems in the literature on belief change. However, up to now, iteration of expansion was only studied as a special case of consistent revision and, as far we know, there is
Eduardo Fermé, Renata Wassermann
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PLoS ONE, 2021 On the basis of the cognitive–affective–behavioral model, this study investigated the effects of narrative transportation in movies on audience emotion and positive word-of-mouth (PWOM).
Shih-Tse Wang, Yao-Chien Tang
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Jokes and Belief Revision [PDF]
Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 2020 The paper deals with a topic little studied in artificial intelligence: the understanding of humor. In this preliminary study, we try to identify the basic mechanism at work in quips and narrative jokes. It seems that in many cases a belief revision process is operating, leading to an unexpected conclusion, through the punchline of the jest.
Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr, Henri Prade
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Reinforcement Belief Revision [PDF]
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2008 The capability of revising its beliefs upon new information in a rational and efficient way is crucial for an intelligent agent. The classical work in belief revision focuses on idealized models and is not concerned with computational aspects. In particular, many researchers are interested in the logical properties (e.g.
Yi Jin 0006, Michael Thielscher
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DYNAMIC HYPERINTENSIONAL BELIEF REVISION [PDF]
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2020 AbstractWe propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their ...
Aybüke Özgün, Francesco Berto
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Frontline Learning Research, 2013 The cognitive sciences, including psychology and education, have their roots in antiquity. In the historically early disciplines like logic and philosophy, the purpose of inquiry was normative. Logic sought to formalize valid inferences, and the various
Stellan Ohlsson
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Belief Revision Revisited [PDF]
, 2005 In this paper, we propose a new belief revision operator, together with a method of its calculation. Our formalization differs from most of the traditional approaches in two respects. Firstly, we formally distinguish between defeasible observations and indefeasible knowledge about the considered world.
Ewa Madalinska-Bugaj, Witold Lukaszewicz
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Principia: An International Journal of EpistemologyBelief Revision studies how rational agents change their beliefs in response to new information. The main objective of the works in this area is modelling these dynamics by defining some formal operators of change.
Rafael R. Testa
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