Results 261 to 270 of about 2,498,764 (311)
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"Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
Econometrica, 1996Summary: This paper constructs a space of states of the world representing the exhaustive uncertainty facing each player in a strategic situation. The innovation is that preferences are restricted primarily by ``regularity'' conditions and need not conform with subjective expected utility theory.
Epstein, Larry G, Wang, Tan
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Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1997Abstract: The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that ‘that’‐clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this “Specification Assumption”, that for a belief report of the form ‘A believes that p’ to be true,’ the proposition that p must be among the ...
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2013
People seem to believe some pretty strange things; at least they say things that suggest that they do. Among the more dramatic of these are the various monothematic delusions which have recently been the focus of much philosophical discussion:1 Patients suffering, for example, from the Capgras syndrome claim that a loved one, typically a spouse or ...
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People seem to believe some pretty strange things; at least they say things that suggest that they do. Among the more dramatic of these are the various monothematic delusions which have recently been the focus of much philosophical discussion:1 Patients suffering, for example, from the Capgras syndrome claim that a loved one, typically a spouse or ...
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European Journal of Philosophy
AbstractOur interest in understanding belief stems partly from our being creatures who think. However, the term ‘belief’ is used to refer to many states: from the fully conscious rational state that partly constitutes knowledge to the fanciful states of alarm clocks. Which of the many ‘belief’ states must a theory of belief be answerable to?
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AbstractOur interest in understanding belief stems partly from our being creatures who think. However, the term ‘belief’ is used to refer to many states: from the fully conscious rational state that partly constitutes knowledge to the fanciful states of alarm clocks. Which of the many ‘belief’ states must a theory of belief be answerable to?
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief
Analytic Philosophy, 2014It is widely thought that we are at least sometimes responsible for our doxastic attitudes. We can be praised, blamed, or neutrally appraised for our beliefs, disbeliefs, and withholdings. However, many epistemologists have also pointed out that, despite the fact that we are responsible both for certain actions and for certain beliefs, there are ...
Peels, Rik, Booth, Anthony
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Belief Fusion: Aggregating Pedigreed Belief States
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 2001The problem of multi-agent belief aggregation is considered. A new operation, called belief fusion, for combining the beliefs of agents informed by some set of sources which are ordered by reliability is introduced. An (anonymous) belief state is defined as a total pre-order over the set of possible worlds (interpretations) \(\mathcal W\).
Maynard-Reid, Pedrito II, Shoham, Yoav
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Synthese, 1981
AbstractA puzzle about indexical or self‐locating belief is discussed. It is argued that with the help of the apparatus of propositional concepts and diagonal propositions developed in ch. 4 (’Assertion’) and 6 (Semantics for belief’), the phenomena can be reconciled with the doctrine of propositions—the thesis that the objects of belief are impersonal
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AbstractA puzzle about indexical or self‐locating belief is discussed. It is argued that with the help of the apparatus of propositional concepts and diagonal propositions developed in ch. 4 (’Assertion’) and 6 (Semantics for belief’), the phenomena can be reconciled with the doctrine of propositions—the thesis that the objects of belief are impersonal
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