Results 11 to 20 of about 17,303,475 (361)
We investigate the challenge of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning in partially competitive environments, where traditional methods struggle to foster reciprocity-based cooperation. LOLA and POLA agents learn reciprocity-based cooperative policies by differentiation through a few look-ahead optimization steps of their opponent. However, there is a
Aghajohari, Milad+4 more
arxiv +4 more sources
Distributed Inertial Best-Response Dynamics [PDF]
The note considers the problem of computing pure Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in distributed (i.e., network-based) settings. The paper studies a class of inertial best response dynamics based on the fictitious play (FP) algorithm. It is shown that inertial best response dynamics are robust to informational limitations common in distributed settings.
Brian Swenson+3 more
arxiv +7 more sources
On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games [PDF]
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of
Brian Swenson, Ryan W. Murray, S. Kar
arxiv +2 more sources
Best affine unbiased response decomposition [PDF]
AbstractGiven two linear regression models y1=X1β1+u1 and y2=X2β2+u2 where the response vectors y1 and y2 are unobservable but the sum y=y1+y2 is observable, we study the problem of decomposing y into components ŷ1 and ŷ2, intended to be close to y1 and y2, respectively. We develop a theory of best affine unbiased decomposition in this setting.
Erik Schokkaert+2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Approximate Best-Response Dynamics in Random Interference Games [PDF]
In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In contrast to congestion games, interference games are generally not potential games.
Ilai Bistritz, Amir Leshem
arxiv +3 more sources
Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games [PDF]
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random.
Amiet, Ben+3 more
core +2 more sources
Tempered best response dynamics [PDF]
We propose a new deterministic evolutionary dynamic—the tempered best response dynamic (tBRD)—to capture two features of economic decision making: optimization and continuous sensitivity to incentives. That is, in the tBRD, an agent is more likely to revise his action when his current payoff is further from the optimal payoff, and he always switches to
Dai Zusai
openaire +2 more sources
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics [PDF]
Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best response moves. A {\em deviator rule} $S$ is a method for selecting the next deviating player.
Michal Feldman+2 more
openaire +4 more sources
The Best Hysterias: Author's Response to Ghaemi
Nassir Ghaemi has helped raise the profile of this truly debilitating disorder [ 1], but he is wrong on the history of bipolar disorder. First, mental disease entities are a recent construct. No disease resembling bipolar disorder was described before 1854 in Paris, and the links between folie circulaire described then and modern bipolar disorder are ...
David Healy
openaire +5 more sources
Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games. [PDF]
We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence—the order in which players update their actions—is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic ...
Heinrich T+6 more
europepmc +3 more sources