Results 281 to 290 of about 12,963,167 (313)
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics [PDF]
Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best ...
M. Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
semanticscholar +4 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
The Best Response to Digital Disruption
Who Wins in a Digital World?, 2017Companies that adopt bold offensive strategies in the face of industry digitization will come out the winners.
J. Bughin, N. Zeebroeck
semanticscholar +2 more sources
Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Multiplayer Games Under Asynchronous Best-Response Dynamics
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2023As an important branch of evolutionary game theory, iterated games describe the situations that interacting agents play repeatedly based on previous outcomes by using the conditional strategies.
Yuying Zhu, Chengyi Xia, Zengqiang Chen
semanticscholar +1 more source
Strategic Best Response Fairness in Fair Machine Learning
AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 2022While artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have been increasingly used for decision-making, issues related to discrimination in AI/ML have become prominent.
Hajime Shimao +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets
Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2021In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N -player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response to some ...
Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer
semanticscholar +1 more source
Many Agent Games in Socio-economic Systems: Corruption, Inspection, Coalition Building, Network Growth, Security, 2019
In this chapter our basic tool, the dynamic law of large numbers (LLN, whose descriptive explanation was given in Chapter 1), is set on a firm mathematical foundation. We prove several versions of this LLN, with different regularity assumptions on the coefficients, with and without major players, and finally with a distinguished (or tagged) player, the
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov, O. Malafeyev
semanticscholar +3 more sources
In this chapter our basic tool, the dynamic law of large numbers (LLN, whose descriptive explanation was given in Chapter 1), is set on a firm mathematical foundation. We prove several versions of this LLN, with different regularity assumptions on the coefficients, with and without major players, and finally with a distinguished (or tagged) player, the
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov, O. Malafeyev
semanticscholar +3 more sources
On Synchronous, Asynchronous, and Randomized Best-Response Schemes for Stochastic Nash Games
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020In this paper, we consider a stochastic Nash game in which each player minimizes a parameterized expectation-valued convex objective function. In deterministic regimes, proximal best-response (BR) schemes have been shown to be convergent under a suitable
Jinlong Lei +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2011
We present a new framework for auction design and analysis that we term "best-response auctions". We use this framework to show that the simple and myopic best-response dynamics converge to the VCG outcome and are incentive compatible in several well-studied auction environments (Generalized Second Price auctions, and auctions with unit-demand bidders).
Noam Nisan +3 more
openaire +2 more sources
We present a new framework for auction design and analysis that we term "best-response auctions". We use this framework to show that the simple and myopic best-response dynamics converge to the VCG outcome and are incentive compatible in several well-studied auction environments (Generalized Second Price auctions, and auctions with unit-demand bidders).
Noam Nisan +3 more
openaire +2 more sources
Knowledge and best responses in games [PDF]
Annals of Operations Research, 1994 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
Journal of Economic Theory, 2006
Abstract This paper introduces a notion of p -best response set ( p -BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p -best response set ( p -MBR). After proving general existence results of the p -MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson ...
openaire +2 more sources
Abstract This paper introduces a notion of p -best response set ( p -BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p -best response set ( p -MBR). After proving general existence results of the p -MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson ...
openaire +2 more sources