Results 251 to 260 of about 3,575,498 (283)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
Review of Economic Design, 2017zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
David Cantala
exaly +3 more sources
Boston School Choice Mechanism for User Association in Heterogeneous Networks
2018 14th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob), 2018This paper presents the application of a particular class of matching game models, namely the Boston school choice approach, to the problem of user association in heterogeneous networks. Simulation results are provided to assess the performance of the Boston mechanism and the Gale-Shapley algorithm used in the college admission game concerning overall ...
Ahmed H Abd El-Malek, Maha Elsabrouty
exaly +3 more sources
Is The Boston Brace Mechanically Effective in AIS?
2002The application of three-point loading is thought to be the essential basis for effective bracing of adolescent idiopathic scoliosis. Care is taken to ensure that active pressure pad is located to provide maximum support to the apex of the scoliosis while minimizing its lordosising effect. Paradoxically, while cited as an essential factor in the design
V J, Raso +4 more
openaire +2 more sources
The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments
Experimental Economics, 2019AbstractThis paper introduces a new matching mechanism that is a hybrid of the two most common mechanisms in school choice, the Boston Mechanism (BM) and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA). BM is the most commonly used mechanism in the field, but it is neither strategyproof nor fair.
Umut Dur +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare ...
Atila Abdulkadiroglu +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism [PDF]
, 2010 The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it respects preference rankings and satisfies consistency ...
Fuhito Kojima, M. Utku Ünver
openaire
Securing priorities in the Boston mechanism
In this paper, we study a school choice problem in which students' preference lists and schools' priority orderings are strict. We introduce a new mechanism, the priority secure Boston mechanism (PsBM), under which each school secures its quota of students with the highest priorities--ensuring that they are accepted whenever they apply--following the ...Shanhui Yang, Xieji Zhang
openaire +1 more source
Mechanisms of policy failure: Boston’s 2024 Olympic bid
Urban Studies, 2017Planning for mega-events such as the Olympics is at a turning point. There has been a power shift in the relationship between cities and the International Olympic Committee towards the former. This shift is based on the emergence of anti-bid opposition movements; the increasing complexity of bidding; demands for locally relevant legacies; and a ...
Eva Kassens-Noor, John Lauermann
openaire +1 more source
Fairness of the Boston Matching Mechanism in China's College Admissions
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016We develop a method to measure the fairness of school matching mechanisms and apply it to the Boston mechanism used in the Chinese college admissions system. Fairness is measured by mismatch, or the gap between the actual and fair matching outcomes. An individual’s mismatch is then related to his/her behavior toward the first choice in the preference ...
Binzhen Wu, Xiaohan Zhong
openaire +1 more source
Fair Procedures with Naive Agents: Who Wants the Boston Mechanism?
2019We study preferences over procedures in the presence of naive agents. We employ a school choice setting following Pathak and Sonmez (2008) who show that sophisticated agents are better off under the Boston mechanism than under a strategy-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere.
König, Tobias +3 more
openaire +2 more sources