Results 191 to 200 of about 32,672 (261)

Carnap’s Early Semantics

Erkenntnis, 2012
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Carnap's Noncognitivism about Ontology

Noûs, 2018
Do numbers exist? Carnap (1956 [1950]) famously argues that this question can be understood in an “internal” and in an “external” sense, and calls “external” questions “non-cognitive”.
Vera Flocke
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Fraenkel-Carnap properties

MLQ, 2005
Summary: In the 1920's Fraenkel and Carnap raised the question of whether or not every finitely axiomatizable semantically complete theory formulated in the theory of types is categorical. Partial answers to this and a related question are presented for theories formulated in second-order logic.
George Weaver, Benjamin R. George
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Overcoming Metametaphysics: Nietzsche and Carnap

Nietzsche-Studien, 2018
This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics ...
Felipe G. A. Moreira
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With Carnap, Beyond Carnap:

1994
Si avanza una nuova interpretazione della posizione assunta da Carnap nella controversia fra realisti e strumentalisti. Tale interpretazione porta in primo piano l'idea, fino ad allora trascurata, della 'neutralità ontologica'. Attraverso l'esame della controversia sull'ontologia fra Quine e Carnap viene difesa su basi rinnovate una concezione anti ...
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Carnap’s Conception of Philosophy

2012
In one respect it seems easy to explain Carnap’s conception of philosophy: he is believed to be a proponent of scientific philosophy – or, stating it in other words, many believe that he tried to help to establish philosophy as an exact science. However in a later interview Carnap explained how this idea rested on a simple misunderstanding.
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Carnap and logical truth

Synthese, 1960
Kant’s question ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ precipitated the Critique of Pure Reason. Question and answer notwithstanding, Mill and others persisted in doubting that such judgments were possible at all. At length some of Kant’s own clearest purported instances, drawn from arithmetic, were sweepingly disqualified (or so it seemed ...
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Carnap

2002
AbstractIn Vienna during the 1920s there emerged a group of philosophers — the logical positivists — who wished to deny that any metaphysical questions were meaningful. Although they held much of the Tractatus in high regard, they took the parts of it which gestured towards the unsayable — especially the mystical sections near the end of the book — to ...
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Carnap on Logic and Experience

2002
In recent years, attention for the work of Rudolf Carnap has shifted from polemical discussion to placing Carnap in his intellectual context. Thus, the central question is no longer whether Carnap contributes to solving our current problems, but whether he solved the problems of his day and age.
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Carnap and translational indeterminacy

Synthese, 1995
InWord and Object W. V. Quine argues that there is no uniquely correct way to assign referents to the terms of a language; any claim about the reference of a term is implicitly relative to a manual of translation. To Rudolf Carnap this must have seemed familiar.
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