PENGARUH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN KARAKTERISTIK CEO TERHADAP KINERJA KEUANGAN PERUSAHAAN PERBANKAN KONVENSIONAL YANG TERCATAT DI BEI PERIODE 2010-2014 [PDF]
Raymita Hendari, 2016; The Effects Of Corporate Governance and CEO Characteristic Toward Financial Performance of The Conventional Banking Companies Listed in BEI Period 2010-2014.
HENDARI, RAYMITA
core
ABSTRACT ESG practices offer various benefits for family firms; however, there has been limited focus on how these practices can specifically advantage the owning family. To address this gap, we conduct a multiple‐case study of six Italian family firms.
Rafaela Gjergji +4 more
wiley +1 more source
CEO Compensation among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging Markets [PDF]
Using a novel data base for three emerging markets, we find that the type of large shareholder matters for CEO compensation. In particular, we find a compensation premium of about 30 log points for professional (not controller-related) CEOs working in ...
Borja Larraín, Francisco Gallego
core
Breadth at the Helm: Generalist CEOs and Corporate ESG Performance‐Evidence From China
ABSTRACT Drawing on the Upper Echelons Theory and the Imprinting Theory, this study conjectures that generalist CEOs may have a stronger tendency to pursue environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals. We perform multiple regression analyses with observations of Shanghai and Shenzhen A‐share listed companies from 2010 to 2023 in order to explore ...
Shanmei Luo +4 more
wiley +1 more source
The development of family firms led to increase the funding requirement for expansion. Family firms can obtain funds from capital market by doing initial public offering (IPO).
I Made Sudana, Ni Putu Nina Aristina
doaj +1 more source
Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders [PDF]
In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result of bargaining between CEOs and
Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. +2 more
core +1 more source
ABSTRACT Extant literature assumes that powerful executives can wield their influence with minimal opposition from lower‐power actors. We reconsider this assumption by incorporating the coalitional view in which lower‐power actors can mobilize coalitions to resist.
Nhan Huong Nguyen +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? [PDF]
Data for a sample of 558 CEOs over 1985-1990 suggest substantial compensation premia for managers of diversified firms. The CEO of a firm with two distinct lines of business averages 10 to 12 percent more in salary and bonus and 13 to 17 percent more in ...
Andrea Shepard, Nancy L. Rose
core
PENGARUH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, KOMPENSASI CEO, KARAKTERISTIK CEO, DAN PROFITABILITAS TERHADAP AGRESIVITAS PAJAK (Studi Empris pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di BEI tahun 2013 - 2016) [PDF]
The measure of tax aggressiveness behaviour based on the magnitude of corporate goals to minimize the tax payments. The other conditions that can link to the tax aggressiveness is the firm goals which is considered to be a motivation factor for the firm ...
FAIZAH, Nabilla, MUID, Dul
core
Getting By With The Advice Of Their Friends: Ceos' Advice Networks And Firms' Strategic Responses To Poor Performance [PDF]
This paper theorizes that relatively poor firm performance can prompt chief executive officers (CEOs) to seek more advice from executives of other firms who are their friends or similar to them and less advice from acquaintances or dissimilar others and ...
McDonald, M. L., Westphal, J. D.
core +1 more source

