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Impact of Body Mass Index Variability on Kidney Disease Progression in a Large Type 1 Diabetes Cohort. [PDF]
Diabetes Metab Res RevOzdede M +5 more
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Regulation of immunological equilibrium by IL-6/STAT3 in glaucomatous irises and its effect on filtering bleb success. [PDF]
Indian J OphthalmolSinha N +4 more
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Enhancing Early Medical Education Through Patient Engagement: Creation of a Toolkit Informed by Experts by Experience. [PDF]
Clin TeachSaif J, Rogers D, Stocker C.
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The Company of Biologists: a century in review. [PDF]
Biol OpenMoulton OC, Adhikari S, Ward K.
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Achieving equity to fully realise the pandemic agreement. [PDF]
BMJ Glob HealthSilva DS, Pahlman K, Smith MJ.
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Abstract In an extended and unusual treatment of different aspects of charity, the Jerusalem Talmud tractate Peah chapter 8, raises charity to the level of saving lives quite literally, and it need be treated as one would a trial for capital punishment. What is the poverty level? Who is qualified to distribute charity and how often? What
Brandon C. Dulisse, Connor Griffith
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Abstract In an extended and unusual treatment of different aspects of charity, the Jerusalem Talmud tractate Peah chapter 8, raises charity to the level of saving lives quite literally, and it need be treated as one would a trial for capital punishment. What is the poverty level? Who is qualified to distribute charity and how often? What
Brandon C. Dulisse, Connor Griffith
+11 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
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In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
openaire +1 more source