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Probabilistic Coalition Structure Generation

, 2018
Schwind, Nicolas, Okimoto, Tenda, Inoue, Katsumi, Hirayama, Katsutoshi, Lagniez, Jean-Marie, Marquis, Pierre   +5 more
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The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures

Games and Economic Behavior, 2002
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Anna Bogomolnaia, Matthew O Jackson
exaly   +3 more sources

Fuzzy coalition structures

Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2000
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
exaly   +3 more sources

On the stability of coalition structures

Economics Letters, 2008
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
André Casajus
exaly   +3 more sources

On the computation of probabilistic coalition structures [PDF]

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2021
In Coalition Structure Generation (CSG), one seeks to form a partition of a given set of agents into coalitions such that the sum of the values of each coalition is maximized. This paper introduces a model for Probabilistic CSG (PCSG), which extends the standard CSG model to account for the stochastic nature of the environment, i.e., when some of the ...
Nicolas Schwind, Tenda Okimoto, Katsumi Inoue, Katsutoshi Hirayama, Jean-Marie Lagniez, Pierre Marquis   +5 more
openaire   +1 more source

DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURES [PDF]

International Game Theory Review, 2006
The paper explores the properties of multistage games with perfect information, in which (unlike the classic Kuhnian definition) the conditional coalition partition at any vertex is determined by a chance move and remains unchanged until the random process repeats at the next vertex. A new value for such a game is proposed in terms of a PMS-vector. It
LEON PETROSJAN, SVETLANA MAMKINA
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STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES [PDF]

International Game Theory Review, 2014
In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs.
Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato
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Corrigendum to “On coalition formation: durable coalition structures”

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2003
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Barberà, Salvador, Gerber, Anke
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