Results 141 to 150 of about 10,915 (206)

We‐Mode as Layered Agency

open access: yes
Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
Lukas Schwengerer
wiley   +1 more source

A Formal Theory of Robert Nozick's Framework for Utopia

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper offers the very first formal model of Robert Nozick's model of possible worlds and his vision of a utopian society, as outlined in Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick envisioned utopia as a meta‐utopia—a collection of self‐organized, voluntary sub‐communities—arguing that such an institutional framework is equivalent to ...
Susumu Cato, Hun Chung
wiley   +1 more source

Structural Injustice and Self‐Development

open access: yes
Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
Azizjon Bagadirov
wiley   +1 more source

Navigating troubled waters: Posthumanist vulnerability and entanglement in Richard Powers's Playground (2024)

open access: yesOrbis Litterarum, EarlyView.
Abstract Richard Powers's most recent novels to date—The Overstory (2018), Bewilderment (2021), and Playground (2024)—engage with some of the environmental and technological threats that loom over our planet, such as deforestation, species loss, the degradation of the ocean bottom, and the risks associated with the development of generative AI ...
Carmen Laguarta‐Bueno
wiley   +1 more source

AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding ...
Adam Bradley, Bradford Saad
wiley   +1 more source

Contingent Grounding Physicalism

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie ...
Alex Moran
wiley   +1 more source

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