Results 261 to 270 of about 144,353 (287)
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Journal of Financial Economics, 2020
We examine how executive compensation can be designed to motivate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices.
Ha, Sangeun +2 more
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We examine how executive compensation can be designed to motivate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices.
Ha, Sangeun +2 more
openaire +5 more sources
Econometrica, 2009 The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders.
Tröger, Thomas +2 more
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2021
Abstract Employers collude in labor markets in a variety of ways. They fix wages, agree not to poach each other’s workers, and exchange information. They also collude with employees by entering covenants not to compete. All of these actions are anticompetitive and they often violate the antitrust laws, but it is difficult for workers to ...
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Abstract Employers collude in labor markets in a variety of ways. They fix wages, agree not to poach each other’s workers, and exchange information. They also collude with employees by entering covenants not to compete. All of these actions are anticompetitive and they often violate the antitrust laws, but it is difficult for workers to ...
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Review of Industrial Organization, 2005
Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible.
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Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible.
openaire +2 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms, they largely ignore individual heterogeneity, such as ...
Haucap, Justus +2 more
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Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms, they largely ignore individual heterogeneity, such as ...
Haucap, Justus +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Free Collusion versus Centralized Collusion
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010This paper generalizes the classical duopoly collusion model by first deriving a new marginal cost curve. It then proves that freely colluded duopolists produce more joint output and enjoy larger joint profit than a monopolist, so they have higher incentive to collude.
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International Game Theory Review, 2020
We analyze the effect of customizing a product on the ability of firms to tacitly collude on prices. Following [Bar-Isaac et al. [2014] Targeted product design: Locating inside the Salop circle, Mimeo], we allow firms to be located inside the circle in the Salop model [Salop, S. [1979] Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell J. Econ., 10(1),
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We analyze the effect of customizing a product on the ability of firms to tacitly collude on prices. Following [Bar-Isaac et al. [2014] Targeted product design: Locating inside the Salop circle, Mimeo], we allow firms to be located inside the circle in the Salop model [Salop, S. [1979] Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell J. Econ., 10(1),
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The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997
The principal-agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations. This theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome, at least partially, the asymmetries of information he faces.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques +1 more
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The principal-agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations. This theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome, at least partially, the asymmetries of information he faces.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques +1 more
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Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow ...
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Journal of Political Economy, 1971
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the problems faced by a collusion which prices above the limit price. Three problems are analyzed: (1) When should the collusive firms lower industry price to the limit price to prevent further entry? (2) Under what conditions should the collusive firms sacrifice immediate profits for a lower rate of entry which ...
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the problems faced by a collusion which prices above the limit price. Three problems are analyzed: (1) When should the collusive firms lower industry price to the limit price to prevent further entry? (2) Under what conditions should the collusive firms sacrifice immediate profits for a lower rate of entry which ...
openaire +1 more source