Results 11 to 20 of about 80,688 (288)

‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument [PDF]

open access: yesRatio, 2013
AbstractThe consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, if determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of ‘can’ in the consequence argument. Classical compatibilists, holding that abilities to act
Grzankowski, Alex
openaire   +4 more sources

The Counterfactual Structure of the Consequence Argument [PDF]

open access: yesErkenntnis, 2019
This paper revisits a well-known rebuttal of Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. This CS-rebuttal, as I shall call it, focuses on the counterfactual structure of alternative possibilities. It shows that the ability to do otherwise is such that if the agent had exercised it, the distant past and/or the laws of nature would have been different.
Rummens, Stefan
openaire   +4 more sources

Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument [PDF]

open access: yesManuscrito
Scott Sehon (2011) argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Sehon says, for instance, that determinism is incompatible
Pedro Merlussi
doaj   +2 more sources

The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism [PDF]

open access: yesRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 2015
In An Essay on Free Will, and in the much later “The Consequence Argument” Peter van Inwagen formulated various versions of what he calls “the consequence argument”.van Inwagen has described the consequence argument as an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will.
Hughes, Christopher
openaire   +4 more sources

Evaluation of Frankfurt's Viewpoint in the Face of Indirect Consequence Argument [PDF]

open access: yesپژوهشنامه فلسفه دین, 2017
The different versions of van Inwagen’s indirect argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility asserts that (1) the causal necessity and determination indicates that human actions are the results of past events and the ...
Javad Danesh
doaj   +1 more source

Constitutive and depictive creativities in philosophy and critical thinking

open access: yesCreativity Studies, 2018
This paper expounds two types of creativities in philosophy while exploring several influential philosophical views and thought experiments. The two types of creativities include constitutive creativity and depictive creativity.
Huiyuhl Yi
doaj   +1 more source

Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131–151, 2003) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom (CCFs) and the ability ...
Cohen, Yishai   +2 more
core   +1 more source

Rene Girard and the phenomenology of mimetic desire [PDF]

open access: yesStudia z Teorii Wychowania, 2023
René Girard has been critiqued for failing to ground his theory of mimetic desire in a discursive and philosophically robust framework. In order to meet this objection, I argue that René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire can be successfully motivated by ...
Gregory Moss
doaj   +1 more source

On Gauge Invariance of the Bosonic Measure in Chiral Gauge Theories

open access: yesUniverse, 2021
Gauge invariance of the measure associated with the gauge field is usually taken for granted, in a general gauge theory. We furnish a proof of this invariance, within Fujikawa’s approach.
Gabriel de Lima e Silva   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

How to make beta better [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual
In this paper, I appeal to a quantified counterfactual logic in order to argue that van Inwagen's new version of the Consequence Argument, unlike the original version of his argument, is logically valid.
Hausmann Marco
doaj   +1 more source

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