Results 131 to 140 of about 853 (173)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2009Abstract Constructive empiricism – as formulated by Bas van Fraassen – makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen’s broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may have various advantages in defending the epistemic
exaly +2 more sources
Bayesian Agnosticism and Constructive Empiricism
Analysis, 19981. How should the traditional doxastic attitude of agnosticism be represented in a Bayesian framework? In Laws and Symmetry, Bas van Fraassen proposes that agnosticism be represented as having a certain type of vague opinion. A Bayesian with no vague opinions assigns sharp subjective probabilities to all propositions in a domain of discourse.
exaly +2 more sources
Defending constructive empiricism [PDF]
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of ScienceBas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism has significantly shaped the debate on scientific realism. However, many commentators have been puzzled by the precise nature of the argument for this position. This paper reconstructs that argument.
Van Dyck, Maarten
core +4 more sources
van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism
Cogito, 1997 An introductory discussion of constructive ...
Sankey, Howard
core +3 more sources
Constructive empiricism, observability and three kinds of ontological commitment [PDF]
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2006 In this paper, I argue against constructive empiricism that, as far as science is concerned, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guidance of cautious ontological commitment. My argument is in two stages.
Gabriele Contessa
exaly +1 more source
The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation [PDF]
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2018 In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation ...
Moti Mizrahi, Mizrahi Moti
exaly +1 more source
Empiricism, Theoretical Constructs and God
The Journal of Religion, 1974Empiricism in religion has not had its final hearing. There is a ‘Quinean move’, and ‘interpretative move’ and what I shall label a kind of ‘naive empiricism’ that still needs to be heard. I shall start with ‘naive empiricism’ first and then proceed to the other two moves.
openaire +1 more source
In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell’s Master Argument and Aberrant Theories
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2008 Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored.
F A Müller, Müller F A
exaly +2 more sources