Results 221 to 230 of about 221,101 (300)

Mutual Recognition and Moral Luck

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract According to contractualists, whether we are able to lead a flourishing and meaningful life is influenced, in part, by our capacity to relate to other rational self‐governing beings on mutually justifiable terms. At the same time, it seems that our success in relating with our fellow rational creatures on terms that they could not reasonably ...
Ken Oshitani
wiley   +1 more source

Sartre's Private Language Argument

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Various commentators have noted striking parallels between Wittgenstein's reflections on privacy and Sartre's discussions of the body in Being and Nothingness. Nevertheless, these aspects of Sartre's thought have seldom been explored in detail.
Alex Englander
wiley   +1 more source

Beyond Immediate Givenness: Husserl's Content‐Apprehension Schema in Light of Merleau‐Ponty's Critique of Sensation

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (2012 [1945]) opens with a detailed critique of traditional philosophical accounts of sensation, generally understood as having Husserl's “content‐apprehension schema” among its targets. The schema sees perception as resulting from the interpretation (“apprehension” or “apperception”) of “raw ...
Yamina Venuta
wiley   +1 more source

New fossils imply a deeper origin of modern birds in the Mesozoic. [PDF]

open access: yesNatl Sci Rev
Wu S   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source

The Innocence of Imagination?

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract According to a widely held view both within and outside philosophy, imagination is innocent in the sense that it does not influence what we think and do. Hence, we can let our imagination wander anywhere. There are two ways of pushing back against this ‘innocence of imagination’ claim.
Bence Nanay
wiley   +1 more source

Spinoza on Humans as Social Animals

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Spinoza repeatedly suggests that humans are set apart from other animals by their rational and moral abilities. Yet he disparages the traditional definition of the human as a ‘rational animal’ and several of his other views suggest that these abilities are not sufficient by themselves to characterize human nature.
Ruben Noorloos
wiley   +1 more source

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