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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [PDF]

Journal of Political Economy, 1986
In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer ...
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
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The (Geo)Politics of Controlling Shareholders

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023
Abstract In this Article, I extend the analysis of controlling shareholders typically reflected in corporate governance scholarship—which is fundamentally framed in terms of shareholder wealth creation and diversion at the behest of the controller—to the increasing (geo)political significance of firms with controlling shareholders.
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Controlling Non-Controlling Shareholders: The Case of Effective Control

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023
Abstract One of the most important developments underlying capital markets in recent years is the increase in the influence of activist minority shareholders. In a company without a controlling shareholder, dominant and activist shareholders, who hold only a low proportion of the company’s shares, can influence and even tip the scales in
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Shareholder primacy, controlling shareholders and Malaysia’s Companies Act 2016

Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 2016
ABSTRACTThe predominant corporate governance model within the Commonwealth mimics that of the UK where powers of management are reserved for the board. This director primacy model, however, is being challenged by proposals to expand shareholders’ decision-making rights including giving shareholders the power to initiate their own proposals and to ...
Aiman Nariman Mohd-Sulaiman, Shanty Rachagan   +1 more
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Contesting corporate control: shareholder voting

International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2013
In this study we examine the outcome of shareholder proposals and focus on the factors leading to a majority vote. Our findings include: 1) the issues of a proposal play a significant role in determining whether or not the proposal achieves majority shareholder support; 2) ownership structure plays a significant role in the occurrence of a majority ...
Maggie Foley, Robert Boylan, Chengru Hu, Biqing Huang   +3 more
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Controlling shareholders and their duties

2021
We focus on the rules governing the duties of controlling shareholders to minority shareholders in three jurisdictions, the US, Germany and Italy. We argue that despite differences in the specific laws and enforcement mechanisms used to address the duties of controlling shareholders, functionally the principles and conceptual goals across these ...
Balp, Gaia, Ventoruzzo, Marco
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Multiple large shareholders and controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As

Applied Economics Letters, 2021
This paper examines the impact of a common ownership structure – multiple large shareholders (MLS) – on controlling shareholders’ related-party mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
Yanyan Shen, Xiaotong Yang, Bing Zhu
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Controlling Shareholders' Value and Corporate Tax Avoidance*

Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 2022
AbstractThis paper investigates whether and how controlling shareholders' value (i.e., the concentration of controlling shareholders' wealth within a business group) affects corporate tax planning using Korean chaebols. We find that firms with high controlling shareholders' value engage in a lower level of tax avoidance than other affiliates in the ...
Hyungjin Cho, Jeong‐Hoon Hyun, Taejin Jung, Yewon Kim   +3 more
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Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders

2017
The “one-share one-vote principle,” which states that a shareholder’s voting power is proportionate to his or her economic right, is one of the most fundamental rules in modern corporate law. However, in reality, controlling shareholders often obtain voting rights in excess of their economic rights through control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing them to
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Multiple Large Shareholders and Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledging

International Journal of Finance & Economics
ABSTRACTControlling shareholders essentially engage in equity pledging with the goal of promoting their own self‐interest, but few studies have explored the mechanisms that can restrict this activity. By reference to a sample of Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A‐share markets from 2007 to 2022, we find evidence indicating that the ...
Caiyu Yan, Rui Li, Juan Li, Min Zhang
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