Results 261 to 270 of about 1,464,613 (306)
Risk appetite-enhanced game-theoretic approach for modelling mandatory lane-changing behaviour in freeway merging areas. [PDF]
PLoS OneWang B, Wang S, He G.
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From the Selfish Gene to the "We": Cooperation Often Needs Suppressors. [PDF]
BioessaysSalzet M.
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The impact of a mixed exercise intervention on the physical and mental health of left-behind children: a randomized controlled trial combining sports games and ball sports. [PDF]
Front PsycholFang T, Wang A, Wang Y, Li H.
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Effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in large language model agents. [PDF]
Sci RepSakai M +3 more
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Analysis of inter-brain synchrony in group-based electroencephalography to assess task-dependent interactions. [PDF]
Front NeuroergonKennedy A +3 more
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The selectope for cooperative games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2000 The authors investigate the distribution of payoff within a coalition. As usual, a cooperative game is defined by the value function on coalitions. A set of distributions is constructed in the following way. The difference of the value of a coalition and the summarized value of all its sub-coalitions forms the dividend of Harsanyi.
Jean Derks +2 more
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International Game Theory Review, 2000
We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Jerzy A. Filar, Leon A. Petrosjan
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We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Jerzy A. Filar, Leon A. Petrosjan
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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Qizhi Fang +3 more
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Qizhi Fang +3 more
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On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jeroen Kuipers +2 more
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International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2008
We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables.
Paul E. Dunne +3 more
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We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables.
Paul E. Dunne +3 more
openaire +2 more sources