Results 71 to 80 of about 37,125 (229)

Conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay

open access: yes, 2019
We provide conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that our conditions actually imply asymptotically stable equilibrium and delay independence.
Alvarado-Santos, Eduardo   +2 more
core   +1 more source

Cross‐Ownership and Endogenous R&D Risk in Cournot Triopoly

open access: yesThe Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We examine how cross‐ownership influences firms' endogenous R&D risk‐taking in a Cournot triopoly, where two “insider” firms hold passive equity stakes in each other, and a third firm remains unaffiliated. Firms invest in stochastic R&D that lowers marginal costs and choose their risk level—measured by outcome variance—prior to quantity ...
Mingqing Xing, Ally Quan Zhang
wiley   +1 more source

Incentives and welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and complement goods.
Jin, Jim Y.
core  

The role of observability in futures markets [PDF]

open access: yes, 2006
Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that in an oligopolistic industry the introduction of a futures market that operates prior to the spot market induces more competitive outcomes. Hughes and Kao (1997) show that this result presumes that firms’
Ferreira, José Luis
core   +3 more sources

Consumers' Environmental Awareness and Firms' Managerial Delegation Contracts Under Emission Tax Policies

open access: yesScottish Journal of Political Economy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers consumers' environmental awareness of polluting firms' managerial delegation contracts and compares the effects of committed and time‐consistent emission tax policies. It reveals that when environmental performance (EP) incentives prevail, sales performance (SP) incentives depend on the emission tax type and competition ...
Lili Xu, Yuntong Yin, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Complex dynamics and control investigation of a Cournot triopoly game formed based on a log-concave demand function

open access: yesAdvances in Mechanical Engineering, 2017
This article investigates the dynamics of a Cournot triopoly game whose demand function is characterized by log-concavity. The game is formed using the bounded rationality approach.
K Alnowibet, SS Askar, AA Elsadany
doaj   +1 more source

Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms [PDF]

open access: yes
We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms. A departure from the standard setting, i.e., one where all firms maximize profits, provides new insights. A welfare-maximizing public
Arghya Ghosh, Manipushpak Mitra
core  

Spatial price competition and buyer power in the U.S. beef packing industry

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 108, Issue 3, Page 771-798, May 2026.
Abstract We develop a spatially‐explicit model of the U.S. beef packing industry to study key questions related to competition in an oligopsony setting. Cattle supplies are modeled at the county level, and packing plants' location, capacity, and ownership are taken as given. Packers procure negotiated cattle by competing in prices in each local (county)
GianCarlo Moschini, T. Jake Smith
wiley   +1 more source

Stability Analysis of a Master–Slave Cournot Triopoly Model: The Effects of Cross-Diffusion

open access: yesAxioms
A Cournot triopoly is a type of oligopoly market involving three firms that produce and sell homogeneous or similar products without cooperating with one another.
Maria Francesca Carfora   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited

open access: yesBulletin of Economic Research, Volume 78, Issue 2, Page 368-384, April 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley   +1 more source

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