Results 91 to 100 of about 4,610 (184)
Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. [PDF]
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int.
Topuzu, Mihaela +1 more
core
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 402-419, Summer 2026.ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
Mixed motives in a Cournot game [PDF]
The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or ...
Thomas Riechmann
core
Cournot-Nash Family Decision and Economic Growth in an Extended Solowian Model
Academicus International Scientific Journal, 2020 The purpose of this paper is to study economic growth with family-based microeconomic foundation. It develops a neoclassical growth model of endogenous wealth accumulation and consumption of two-person families.
Wei-Bin Zhang
doaj +1 more source
Strategic delegation and risk‐taking in R&D: Partial delegation versus full delegation
International Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 183-207, June 2026.Abstract We examine firm's risk‐taking decisions in R&D under two different delegation strategies between partial delegation (PD) and full delegation (FD): FD authorizes both quantity and R&D risk but PD only authorizes quantity. Cournot firms under the FD set higher profit weights at the expected value of cost realization, which can lessen competition,
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential in a differentiated duopoly with unions and labour decreasing returns [PDF]
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly, total wage bill maximizing unions and labour decreasing returns. It is shown that the standard result, that equilibrium profits are always higher under Cournot, may be ...
Nicola Meccheri, Luciano Fanti
core +2 more sources
A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action [PDF]
Economica, 1987 The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective ...
openaire +1 more source
Do carbon prices affect stock prices?
Journal of Financial Research, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 631-665, Summer 2026.Abstract We explore how carbon pricing affects corporate financial performance during Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We find that the relationship between carbon prices and stock prices depends critically on the proportion of verified emissions covered by freely allocated ETS allowances: For firms with a greater ...
Patrick Bolton +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Quantum Games with Unawareness with Duopoly Problems in View
Entropy, 2019 Playing the Cournot duopoly in the quantum domain can lead to the optimal strategy profile in the case of maximally correlated actions of the players.
Piotr Frąckiewicz, Jakub Bilski
doaj +1 more source
The Journal of Finance, Volume 81, Issue 3, Page 1321-1375, June 2026.ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders.
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley +1 more source