Results 191 to 200 of about 13,799,325 (229)
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An Economical Model For Dumping by Dumping in a Cournot Model
2011We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment.
Banik, Nilanjan +3 more
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On Chaos in Cournot Duopoly Model
2011 Fourth International Workshop on Chaos-Fractals Theories and Applications, 2011In this paper, we discuss the chaotic behavior in Cournot duopoly economic model. We mainly introduce the state feedback control method and the parameter feedback control method to stabilize the chaotic system. Additionally, we also display the related economic implications of the adjustment strategy.
Zhenhua Jiao, Liping Yan, Conghao Jin
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An Individual Evolutionary Learning Model Meets Cournot
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arifovic, Jasmina +2 more
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Stability of the Cournot equilibrium for a Cournot oligopoly model with n competitors
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2012Abstract In this paper a Cournot-like model is constructed with an iso-elastic demand function for n competitors. The Cournot equilibrium is constructed for general constant unit costs. Finally, it is proved that for identical unit costs the Cournot point is a sink for two or three competitors and a saddle for more than four players.
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Tax Incidence and Demand Convexity in Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot–Bertrand Models
Public Finance Review, 2016We investigate the price effect of an excise tax in a duopoly setting. Previous studies have considered the Cournot and Bertrand models but ignore the Cournot–Bertrand model in which one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price.
Mark J. Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay
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The Cournot–Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation
Economics Letters, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Tremblay, Carol Horton +1 more
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Mathematical properties of a discontinuous Cournot–Stackelberg model
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Tramontana, Fabio +2 more
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
Text book analysis shows that there is no giffen input in contrast to existence of giffen good in consumer's case. This paper shows that while this result holds for perfect competiton and monopoly, in the context of Cournot model there can be giffen input.
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Text book analysis shows that there is no giffen input in contrast to existence of giffen good in consumer's case. This paper shows that while this result holds for perfect competiton and monopoly, in the context of Cournot model there can be giffen input.
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A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making*
The Economic Journal, 2001This paper models a two-person family. Each family member is utility maximising, yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family. The two family members’ interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot–Nash, game theoretic framework.
Zhiqi Chen, Frances Woolley
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2011
We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment.
Nilanjan Banik +3 more
openaire +1 more source
We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment.
Nilanjan Banik +3 more
openaire +1 more source