Results 31 to 40 of about 23,743,848 (267)
Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game
Mathematics, 2023 This paper presents a financial Stackelberg game model with two partially informed risk neutral insiders. Each insider receives a private signal about the stock value and competes with the other insider under a Stackelberg setting.
Wassim Daher, Fida Karam, Naveed Ahmed
doaj +1 more source
Mixed supply function‐Cournot equilibrium model of futures and day‐ahead electricity markets
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, 2021 Futures contract is one of the useful financial derivatives for hedging the market players against the risks of undesirable price fluctuations in the power systems.
Mohsen Banaei +3 more
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The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within‐group and cross‐group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group.
Martin Peitz, Susumu Sato
wiley +1 more source
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley +1 more source
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
Market Power in Output and Emissions Trading
Games, 2020 This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including ...
Francisco J. André +1 more
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Fossil Fuels and Renewable Energy: Mix or Match?
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article investigates the influence of technological ownership on pricing strategies and productive efficiency. Our motivation comes from the evolving landscape of electricity markets where firms are transitioning from diversified to specialized portfolios, focusing on renewable energy or fossil fuels.
Natalia Fabra, Gerard Llobet
wiley +1 more source
Product Differentiation Impact on Games Theory Models [PDF]
Ovidius University Annals: Economic Sciences Series, 2020 Imperfect competition represents one of the main topic of modern economic analysis and it can be easily identified in the current economic climate. Whether we are reffering to the aggregate economic field or to a specific industry, certain topics can be ...
Ciprian Rusescu, Mihai Daniel Roman
doaj
Spatial price competition and buyer power in the U.S. beef packing industry
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, EarlyView.Abstract We develop a spatially‐explicit model of the U.S. beef packing industry to study key questions related to competition in an oligopsony setting. Cattle supplies are modeled at the county level, and packing plants' location, capacity, and ownership are taken as given. Packers procure negotiated cattle by competing in prices in each local (county)
GianCarlo Moschini, T. Jake Smith
wiley +1 more source
Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited
Bulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley +1 more source