Results 71 to 80 of about 2,832 (228)

Market Shares as a Collusive Marker: Evidence From the European Truck Industry

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 250-265, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT Collusion theory robustly predicts non‐cartel rivals will raise their prices and increase their output. As a typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share in the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by
Andreas Bovin, Iwan Bos
wiley   +1 more source

Strategic Traffic Management in Mixed Traffic Road Networks: A Methodological Approach Integrating Game Theory, Bilevel Optimization, and C-ITS

open access: yesFuture Transportation
The integration of Connected Vehicles into conventional traffic systems presents significant challenges due to the diverse behaviors and objectives of different drivers. Conventional vehicle drivers typically follow User Equilibrium principles, aiming to
Areti Kotsi   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 266-279, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley   +1 more source

Cournot oligopoly interval games [PDF]

open access: yes
In this paper we consider cooperative Cournot oligopoly games. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies.
Aymeric Lardon
core  

The effects of entry in oligopoly with bargained wages [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
We show that a firm's profits under Cournot oligopoly can be increasing in the number of firms in the industry if wages are determined by decentralised bargaining in unionised bilateral oligopoly.
Naylor, Robin, Soegaard, Christian
core  

Effects of Size, Composition, and Evolutionary Pressure in Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies with Best Response Decisional Mechanisms

open access: yesDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2015
We study heterogeneous Cournot oligopolies of variable sizes and compositions, in which the firms have different degrees of rationality, being either rational firms with perfect foresight or naive best response firms with static expectations.
Fausto Cavalli   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 60-77, Spring 2026.
ABSTRACT We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within‐group and cross‐group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group.
Martin Peitz, Susumu Sato
wiley   +1 more source

Cost Arrangement and Welfare in a Multi-Product Cournot Oligopoly [PDF]

open access: yes
Welfare in a two-product Cournot oligopoly is shown to increase (decrease) with an increase in correlation between unit costs when the outputs complement (substitute) in demand.
Hennessy, David A., Lapan, Harvey E.
core  

The effects of entry in bilateral oligopoly [PDF]

open access: yes, 2002
We show that a firm’s profits under Cournot oligopoly can be increasing in the number of firms in the industry if wages are determined by (decentralised) bargaining in unionized bilateral oligopoly.
Naylor, Robin
core  

Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome [PDF]

open access: yes, 2006
We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities.
Ubeda, Luis, Moreno, Diego
core   +1 more source

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