Results 121 to 128 of about 195,365 (128)

Decomposable Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

, 1999
This article shows that a social choice function defined on a domain of separable preferences which satisfies a relatively weak domain-richness condition on a product set of alternatives is (i) strategy-proof and only depends on the tops of the ...
J. Weymark
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis

, 2006
The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making has received attention in the social psychology literature. Faced with a risky group decision, individuals appear to support more extreme choices relative to those they would make on their own ...
K. Eliaz, Debraj Ray, R. Razin
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems

Games Econ. Behav., 2002
We study house allocation problems introduced by L. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974, J. Math. Econ.1, 23–28). We prove that a mechanism (a social choice function) is individually rational, anonymous, strategy-proof, and nonbossy (but not necessarily Pareto ...
Eiichi Miyagawa
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees

, 1993
We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked
S. Barberà, Faruk Gul, E. Stacchetti
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments

, 1997
March 1997 Arrow's ``impossibility'' and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but ``saturating'' domains of privately oriented ...
Georges Bordes, P. Hammond, M. Le Breton
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Aggregating Ordinal Probabilities on Finite Sets

, 1997
This article considers the aggregation of individual probability binary relations (ordinal probabilities) into a consensus relation when the set of states is finite.
J. Weymark
semanticscholar   +1 more source

On the Invariance of a Mean Voter Theorem

, 1995
Under the assumption that preferences can be represented by linear-in parameters utility functions, Caplin and Nalebuff ( Econometrica 59 (1991), 1-23) have demonstrated that in a super-majority voting problem, the mean voter′s choice is unbeatable ...
Barry K. Ma, J. Weiss
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019
S. Barberà, W. Bossert, K. Suzumura
semanticscholar   +1 more source