Results 51 to 60 of about 195,976 (128)
Social consistency and individual rationality [PDF]
This paper aims at proving that social interactions can easily be rationalized by individual preferences as defined in standard microeconomic theory. For that purpose, we show individual choice rationality to be logically equivalent to social consistency,
Antoine Billot
core
PROTOCOL: Critical appraisal of methodological quality and reporting items of systematic reviews with meta-analysis in evidence-based social science in China: A systematic review. [PDF]
Guo L+7 more
europepmc +1 more source
Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability [PDF]
We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual ...
Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama
core
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation" [PDF]
This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents' preferences for understanding how the process works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of ...
Hitoshi Matsushima
core +3 more sources
Non-bossy Social Classification [PDF]
We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned into classes if individuals express their views about who should be put with whom in the same class. A non-bossiness condition makes the social aggregator dependent only on those cells of the
Clemens Puppe, Dinko Dimitrov
core
Inframarginal externalities: COVID-19, vaccines, and universal mandates. [PDF]
Albrecht BC, Rajagopalan S.
europepmc +1 more source
"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory" [PDF]
This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest.
Hitoshi Matsushima
core
Individuals' Financial Satisfaction and National Priority: A Global Perspective. [PDF]
Gholipour HF+2 more
europepmc +1 more source
Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences [PDF]
In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow''s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Ehlers, Lars, Storcken, Ton
core +1 more source