Results 51 to 60 of about 195,976 (128)

Social consistency and individual rationality [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper aims at proving that social interactions can easily be rationalized by individual preferences as defined in standard microeconomic theory. For that purpose, we show individual choice rationality to be logically equivalent to social consistency,
Antoine Billot
core  

Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability [PDF]

open access: yes
We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual ...
Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama
core  

"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation" [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents' preferences for understanding how the process works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of ...
Hitoshi Matsushima
core   +3 more sources

Multimorbidity. [PDF]

open access: yesNat Rev Dis Primers, 2022
Skou ST   +9 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Non-bossy Social Classification [PDF]

open access: yes
We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned into classes if individuals express their views about who should be put with whom in the same class. A non-bossiness condition makes the social aggregator dependent only on those cells of the
Clemens Puppe, Dinko Dimitrov
core  

"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory" [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest.
Hitoshi Matsushima
core  

Individuals' Financial Satisfaction and National Priority: A Global Perspective. [PDF]

open access: yesSoc Indic Res, 2022
Gholipour HF   +2 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences [PDF]

open access: yes
In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow''s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Ehlers, Lars, Storcken, Ton
core   +1 more source

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