Results 211 to 220 of about 28,328 (233)
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Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration
The American Economic Review, 2022We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare
S. Loertscher, L. Marx
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
, 2013Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people’s strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible.
V. Crawford +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Do Ordeals Work for Selection Markets? Evidence from Health Insurance Auto-Enrollment
The American Economic ReviewAre application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll.
Mark Shepard, Myles Wagner
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Journal of Political Economy
We show how early warning about an impending regime change eliminates panic. Agents anticipate a future shock and decide when to attack. Waiting is costly, especially when others attack and cause a regime change while one waits. This may create panic. We
Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
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We show how early warning about an impending regime change eliminates panic. Agents anticipate a future shock and decide when to attack. Waiting is costly, especially when others attack and cause a regime change while one waits. This may create panic. We
Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period.
K. Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, A. Frug
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We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period.
K. Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, A. Frug
semanticscholar +1 more source
Monitoring in Small Firms: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Public Transit
The American Economic ReviewSmall firms struggle to grow beyond a few employees. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app.
Erin M. Kelley +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsContributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions
Evan M. Calford, T. Cason
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Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsA monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller’s optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers.
Rosina Rodríguez Olivera
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The American Economic Review
A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of ...
Benjamin Brooks +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of ...
Benjamin Brooks +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source