Results 101 to 110 of about 1,613,471 (241)
The apartheid system, with its racial policies and unequal school funding, undeniably led to educational and social disparities that limited access to higher education (HE).
Karunanidhi Reddy, Preleen Govender
doaj +1 more source
The Lender-Borrower Relationship with Risk Averse Lenders [PDF]
This paper analyzes optimal incentive compatible debt contracts when lenders are risk averse. The decisive factor in this regard is that risk aversion requiresto consider further sources of risk the lenders are exposed to.
Thilo Pausch
core
Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt Contracts
Valeri V. Nikolaev
semanticscholar +1 more source
Latin America and the Caribbean Standardized Public Debt Database: Data as of June 2023
This database compiles current standardized statistics on sovereign debt issuances for the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region and contains biannual data starting in 2006 through June 2023. Sovereign debt data is classified by legislation, creditor,
Inter-American Development Bank
core +1 more source
Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts
Daniel Saavedra
semanticscholar +1 more source
Debt Forgiveness: The Case for Hyper-Incentive Contracts. [PDF]
We review two proposals for debt forgiveness; the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and the Jubilee 2000 Coalition Initiative (J2K). We then consider the workhorse model of debt forgiveness (Krugman 1988). We show that the workhorse model solution is a sub-optimal contract, where the incentive parameter is set without regard to the cost of
openaire +2 more sources
Financial contracts and contingent control rights [PDF]
According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain measures of firm performance. If the indicator of the company’s performance (eg earnings
Vauhkonen , Jukka
core +2 more sources
What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts? [PDF]
Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc ...
Tykvová, Tereza
core
Default clauses in debt contracts
Ning-Zhong Li, Yun Lou, F. Vasvari
semanticscholar +1 more source
Inefficient private renegotiation of sovereign debt [PDF]
The negotiation of sovereign debt repayments and of new loans after default may yield inefficient outcomes that justify intervention by creditor country governments and international financial institutions.
Kletzer, Kenneth M.
core

