Results 221 to 230 of about 308,712 (275)

How the Threat of Knowledge Loss Drives Firms’ R&D Dynamism: A Threat Rigidity Perspective

Journal of Management Studies, Volume 63, Issue 7, Page 4284-4321, November 2026.
Abstract Drawing on threat rigidity theory, this paper argues that the threat of knowledge loss gives rise to a threat rigidity effect in firms’ R&D function, that is, reduces their R&D dynamism. It further argues that the dampening of R&D dynamism is greater for firms more vulnerable to the threat of knowledge loss due to facing greater product market
Aman Asija, Dimo Ringov
wiley   +1 more source

Nickel‐Substituted Rubredoxin Undergoes Demetallation Upon Reaction With Nitric Oxide and Nitroxyl

ChemBioChem, Volume 27, Issue 19, 14 October 2026.
Rubredoxin is a thermally stable thiolate iron‐bound protein that can be prepared as a nickel‐substituted one. This nickel protein showed sensitivity to reaction with NO and HNO donors, causing its demetallation. Notably, these reactions exhibit spectroscopic profiles in the ultraviolet–visible and fluorescence with potential bioanalytical use.
Eduardo H. S. Sousa, Thiago Maciel Bastos, Ana C. S. Gondim, Wellinson G. Guimarães, Marcelo H. M. da Silva, Marta S. P. Carepo, Sofia R. Pauleta, Isabel Moura, José J. G. Moura   +8 more
wiley   +1 more source

The development, evolution, and maintenance of structural racism for the study of health inequities: An expanded framework for Asian, Black, Hispanic, Indigenous, and White Americans. [PDF]

Soc Sci Med
Dennis AC, Martinez RAM, Chung EO, Lodge EK, Wilbur RE.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Managerial stock ownership, debt covenants, and the cost of debt

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2023
This study examines the potential role of managerial ownership in determining the number and types of corporate debt covenants and the effect of debt covenants on the relation between managerial ownership and cost of debt.
Steve Lin
exaly   +3 more sources

State Laws and Debt Covenants

The Journal of Law and Economics, 2008
Abstract We examine whether state laws impact the use of debt covenants by using a sample of U.S. public bond issues from 1987 to 2004. We consider variation in state laws with respect to the minimum asset‐to‐debt ratio necessary for a payout and with respect to antitakeover statutes. We find that firms incorporated in states with stricter restrictions
Qi, Yaxuan, Wald, John
openaire   +2 more sources

Essays in debt covenants

, 1998
Detemple, Jerome (Supervisor)
Sy, Amadou Nicolas Racine.
openaire   +2 more sources

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Debt covenants and corporate acquisitions

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018
Abstract We investigate the impact of debt covenants on acquisition characteristics. We find that acquirers with covenants pay lower merger premiums, make more focused acquisitions, and engage in acquisitions with higher synergy gains and higher acquirer returns around deal announcement, relative to those without.
Ahmad Ismail
exaly   +2 more sources

Accounting quality, debt covenant design, and the cost of debt

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2015
We examine whether debt covenant design (threshold tightness, covenants frequency, covenant interdependence, and overall covenant strictness) reduces the adverse effect of poor accounting quality on the cost of debt in the private lending market. We predict and find that when borrowing firms exhibit low accounting quality, lenders tend to increase debt
Joseph H Zhang
exaly   +2 more sources

Debt Covenants and Cross-Sectional Equity Returns

Management Science, 2017
This paper investigates the impact of debt covenant protection on the cross section of equity returns with a firm-level covenant index and four subindices. We find that firms with weaker covenant protection (lower covenant index levels) earn significantly higher risk-adjusted equity returns than do those firms with greater covenant protection.
Jean Helwege, Jing-Zhi Huang
exaly   +2 more sources

Debt covenants and renegotiation

Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1992
Abstract We analyze the value to firms of being able to renegotiate covenants in their debt contracts. Covenants control agency problems, but also reduce firms' flexibility to pursue profitable investments. Initial covenants will be more severe for renegotiable contracts, because they can be relaxed selectively when the lender believes they pose an ...
Mitchell Berlin, Loretta J Mester
openaire   +1 more source