Results 1 to 10 of about 606,407 (263)
Inefficiency and inequity of the law review submission system. [PDF]
PLoS ONEWhere a legal scholar works shapes publication outcomes nearly as much as what they write. Law reviews, the primary publication market for legal scholarship in the United States, are run by student editors who face thousands of submissions for a handful ...
Chad M Topaz
doaj +2 more sources
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities [PDF]
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2014 In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed.
Bettina Klaus
exaly +7 more sources
Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm [PDF]
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting of preferences by the agents on the other side.
Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish
openaire +4 more sources
Analysis of Variation in Blood Donor Deferral Section Statistics as per Drugs and Cosmetics (Second Amendment) Rules, 2020: An Institutional Experience [PDF]
Journal of Clinical and Diagnostic Research, 2023 Introduction: The safety of donated blood is of utmost importance for the well-being of the recipient, which requires proper adherence to donor acceptance criteria.
Anshul Gupta +3 more
doaj +1 more source
The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions [PDF]
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2014 Deferred-acceptance auctions are mechanisms whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal recently introduced these auctions and proved that they satisfy remarkable incentive guarantees: in addition to being dominant strategy and incentive compatible, they are weakly group-strategyproof and can ...
Paul Dütting +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov
openaire +5 more sources
Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2022 This study examines the refugee reallocation problem by modeling it as a two-sided matching problem between countries and refugees. Based on forced hierarchical priority classes, I study two interesting refugee matching algorithms to match refugees with ...
Dilek Sayedahmed
doaj +1 more source
A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2021 We design and implement a program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (DAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in ...
Tobias Reischmann +2 more
doaj +1 more source
BMJ Open Quality, 2023 Background End-of-life care requires support for people to die where they feel safe and well-cared for. End-of-life care may require funding to support dying outside of hospital.
James Richards +4 more
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Matching Students to Schools [PDF]
Economic Horizons, 2017 In this paper, we present the problem of matching students to schools by using different matching mechanisms. This market is specific since public schools are free and the price mechanism cannot be used to determine the optimal allocation of children in ...
Dejan Trifunovic
doaj +1 more source