Results 251 to 260 of about 7,325 (309)

Evidence of cefiderocol-persistence in <i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa in vitro</i> biofilms and in a murine infection model. [PDF]

Biofilm
Mangiaterra G, Lucidi M, Piccioni G, Rosa R, Gugliandolo D, De Fino I, Rossano M, Vignaroli C, Visca P, Bragonzi A, Citterio B.   +10 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Ransomware attacks and cybersecurity concerns in modern hospitals: vulnerabilities and impacts on trauma centers and patient care. [PDF]

Trauma Surg Acute Care Open
Martin MJ, Patel PP, Egodage T.
europepmc   +1 more source

Evaluation of Direct Economic Losses Due to Foot and Mouth Disease Reported by the Epidemiological Surveillance System in Cameroon From 2009 to 2023. [PDF]

Vet Med Sci
Bayang HN, Mouiche Mouliom MM, Mpouam SE, Feussom Kameni JM, Moffo F, Kilekoung JPM.   +5 more
europepmc   +1 more source

EU Delegations in European Union climate diplomacy: the role of links to Brussels, individuals and country contexts

Journal of European Integration, 2019
The European Union’s (EU) Delegations and Offices that represent the Union in 144 countries have evolved into important satellites, implementing EU external relations. Their activities are manifold and are implemented in various ways.
Katja Biedenkopf, Franziska Petri
exaly   +2 more sources

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Repeated Delegation

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
The authors study properties of the following economic model. ``We consider an infinite-horizon game played between a principal P and an agent A, time is discrete. The principal and the agent play the same stage game in every period. Each period the principal chooses whether or not to delegate a project adoption choice to the agent, i.e.
Elliot Lipnowski, João Ramos
openaire   +1 more source

Unobserved Delegation [PDF]

International Economic Review, 1997
Summary: This paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.
Chaim Fershtman, Ehud Kalai
openaire   +3 more sources