Results 51 to 60 of about 7,849 (204)

The Four Pillars of Morality: On the Evolutionary Safe Bets of Right and Wrong

open access: yesJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Volume 56, Issue 1, March 2026.
ABSTRACT In moral psychology, many suggestions have been given regarding the nature of morality as a personality trait and as a biological phenomenon. Discussing both historical and contemporary theories, a bottom‐up genetically influenced theoretical synthesis for morality is proposed.
Erik Forsberg
wiley   +1 more source

Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2017
What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as ...
Derk Pereboom
doaj   +1 more source

Predictive processing's flirt with transcendental idealism

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 87-109, March 2026.
Abstract The popular predictive processing (PP) framework posits prediction error minimization (PEM) as the sole mechanism in the brain that can account for all mental phenomena, including consciousness. I first highlight three ambitions associated with major presentations of PP: (1) Completeness (PP aims for a comprehensive account of mental phenomena)
Tobias Schlicht
wiley   +1 more source

Phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal causality

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 212-232, March 2026.
Abstract There has been extensive debate over whether we can have phenomenal knowledge in the case of epiphenomenalism. This article aims to bring that debate to a close. I first develop a refined causal account of knowledge—one that is modest enough to avoid various putative problems, yet sufficiently robust to undermine the epiphenomenalist position.
Lei Zhong
wiley   +1 more source

Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley   +1 more source

La estrategia intencional de Dennett y el escepticismo

open access: yesIdeas y Valores, 2003
La idea de que la mayoría de nuestras creencias son verdaderas constituye uno de los corolarios más importantes de la doctrina de los sistemas intencionales de Dennett por su significación epistemológica.
Ignacio Ávila Cañamares
doaj  

Dennett, Darwin, and Skinner Crows

open access: yesEvolutionary Psychology, 2005
The central theme of this paper is the scientific viewpoint taken for understanding behavioral processes. Two classical viewpoints are formulated by Dennett (the intentional stance) and Tinbergen (Tinbergen's four questions).
Frans Blommaert, Ruud Janssen
doaj   +1 more source

La concepción del yo en Daniel Dennett: Un análisis de la relación entre la perspectiva heterofenomenológica y el enfoque memético

open access: yesLogos: Revista de Lingüística, Literatura y Filosofía, 2014
El presente trabajo se propone analizar la posición de Daniel Dennett con respecto a la realidad y naturaleza del yo. El autor considera que la concepción del yo humano propia del sentido común, en tanto que un elemento único, simple, idéntico y continuo,
Ayelen Sánchez
doaj   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 335-345, March 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

Book review: Hurley, M. M., Dennett, D. C. & Adams, R. B., Jr. (2011). Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 376 pp.

open access: yesThe European Journal of Humour Research, 2014
A book review of Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind.  by M. M. Hurley, D. C. Dennett, & R. B. Adams, Jr. Cambridge, MA.
Victor Raskin
doaj   +2 more sources

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