Results 1 to 10 of about 19 (19)

Polysemy and roots: Deep versus shallow fetching

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
The paper argues for a model of polysemy based on the blueprint offered by Paul Pietroski whereby the meaning of a lexical item is an instruction to fetch a concept from an address. We show that the bare idea of fetching admits of a deep construal, where a concept is fetched, and a shallow construal, where the instruction merely links a lexical item to
John Collins, Tamara Dobler
wiley   +1 more source

Displacement and quantification without representation

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
Perry and Recanati have argued that thought and speech can concern entities that they do not represent. This is possible because speakers and thinkers are pragmatically situated within their environs. I argue that thought and speech can go much farther than that.
Mihnea Capraru
wiley   +1 more source

In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl

Noûs, EarlyView.
Abstract Cian Dorr, Jacob Nebel, and Jake Zuehl have argued that no objects are incomparable in value. One set of arguments they offer depart from a principle they call ‘Strong Monotonicity’, which states that if x is good and y is not good, then x is better than y.
Erik Carlson, Olle Risberg
wiley   +1 more source

Quotation for Dummies

Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Quotation marks in natural language that do not function straightforwardly as devices for securing reference to linguistic objects have generally been categorized as instances of either mixed quotation or scare quotation. I argue that certain uses of quotation marks in natural language resist assimilation to either of these two theoretical ...
Cameron Domenico Kirk‐Giannini
wiley   +1 more source

Uneventful: Event Semantics for “Qua”

Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Event semantics promise a straightforward account of the truth conditions of qualifications with “as” or “qua” as well as the inferences such qualifications license. In this paper, I argue that these promises are difficult to keep. On natural ways of developing the view, an event semantics of qualification yields either the wrong predictions ...
Annina Loets
wiley   +1 more source

Errant Implicature

Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT To measure is to err. Serving both numeric and non‐numeric measurement, the language of measurement refers to margins of error, within which measurement reports locate their measurements. Such reports and reasoning from them invoke what is known and what is known to be known about error‐strewn measurement to derive and contrast the ...
Barry Schein
wiley   +1 more source

Pure Event Semantics

Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In a pure event semantics for natural language, the domain of quantification and predication is limited to events and states. I offer pure event semantic analyses of several phenomena, some of which have not been treated before in formal semantics. In the pure event semantics sketched in the second section, nouns are state predicates, and this
Roger Schwarzschild
wiley   +1 more source

The agentive achievement of acceptance

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
Abstract Is acceptance an act or a state? Jonathan Cohen is often seen as a proponent of the view that acceptance is a mental act. In contrast, Michael Bratman claims that acceptance is a mental state. This paper argues that the evidence supports a more subtle approach.
Samuel Boardman
wiley   +1 more source

The I in logic

Theoria, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper argues for the significance of Kaplan's logic LD in two ways: first, by looking at how logic got along before we had LD, and second, by using it to bring out the similarity between David Hume's thesis that one cannot deduce claims about the future on the basis of premises only about the past, and the so‐called "essentiality" of the ...
Gillian Russell
wiley   +1 more source

Winged horses, rascals and discourse referents

Theoria, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference.
Andreas Stokke
wiley   +1 more source